Mailing-List: contact user-help@zookeeper.apache.org; run by ezmlm
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: user@zookeeper.apache.org
Subject: Re: Zookeeper with SSL release date
To: user@zookeeper.apache.org
References: <0454CD1B-9018-4D5F-A376-CD29525FF87B@apache.org>
 <CANcXBFPgoe_vvAJFHwKkO7J7NAmLOTDjUSZ4-a7LbFxNf6mg7g@mail.gmail.com>
 <CANLc_9+L7EF+F+GTA5qu9rGqKoXtBYFi=u-bg4sD3W-s4MxmBQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <CANcXBFM2nrLVEbTXoqTjKQ1vCs2oEcYSq+5WpRYFa30PSHLLaA@mail.gmail.com>
 <CANLc_9KnvDgmKHF02f_s0qsB8j=GrC5sqZkwW1U__VtoFaaxiw@mail.gmail.com>
 <CANcXBFPzD5rgkuqPvH0sZ_T33J7L7s0VPuhv_whXve8ssWgUjA@mail.gmail.com>
 <CANLc_9++sRKWp2pzJzeOLMi9ewfM2UGsax2dMkF-bpcXkvQbXA@mail.gmail.com>
 <CANcXBFPSbczPnTZryCo51onVbeqQgsaR0ec1aPnJmD5m2nSGUw@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAA+BczRetxe-+M_FwL-qWw1euwTbZKfYbWr9BRZfxhGfeRa_gA@mail.gmail.com>
 <CANcXBFOWP5rRYGW8cTztsgd3kxX-OosehjzpF9QKYjROGi4kRA@mail.gmail.com>
 <58E62111-0064-4291-B376-D40FFCFFF2A9@apache.org>
 <CANcXBFOqJv_hrCaaokYJ8ccfjO6SDzujFNwsvH7YkQCtXe-62w@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAA+BczTxzN+pYDqNuEEe50HN1_758E=wciJ99rdYsGqi+za8Ew@mail.gmail.com>
 <CANcXBFMsEvLjtXsP5YUHUyobn+tgxiJHLBTTHm8Aqj7fn_0a=Q@mail.gmail.com>
From: Shawn Heisey <apache@elyograg.org>
Message-ID: <56FEACD1.305@elyograg.org>
Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2016 11:16:01 -0600
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101
 Thunderbird/38.7.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: 
 <CANcXBFMsEvLjtXsP5YUHUyobn+tgxiJHLBTTHm8Aqj7fn_0a=Q@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

On 4/1/2016 10:18 AM, Alexander Shraer wrote:
> Because using reconfig without ACLs any client can remove the servers (or
> replace them with a different set of servers
> or change their configuration parameters) and break the system.

This is a potential worry even without reconfig -- a malicious person
could change or delete the entire database ... yet many people
(including me) run without ACLs.

My ZK ensemble is in a network location that unauthorized people can't
reach without finding and exploiting some vulnerability that has not yet
reached my awareness.

If somebody can gain access to the ZK machines, at least one of my
public-facing servers is already compromised.  ZK will be very low on my
list of things to worry about.  Chances are that even if the attacker
figured out I was using ZK and where it lives, it would be extremely low
on THEIR list of priorities -- it doesn't contain any sensitive info,
and there are far more efficient ways to cause problems.

Thanks,
Shawn