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From Rob Weir <robw...@apache.org>
Subject Re: Official code signing certificate
Date Fri, 22 Mar 2013 14:44:45 GMT
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 6:18 PM, Daniel Shahaf <d.s@daniel.shahaf.name> wrote:
> Rob Weir wrote on Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 11:35:21 -0400:
>> On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 9:09 AM, Daniel Shahaf <d.s@daniel.shahaf.name> wrote:
>> > For example: does releasing software under a certificate Microsoft
>> > pre-trusts (or into an app store Apple moderates) subject ASF to an
>> > indemnification clause towards that company?  Does it grant the company
>> > a license to use our trademarks in advertising?  Does it compel ASF to
>> > offer warranty to end-users?
>>
>> I believe that we'd be required to make some sort of assertion that
>> our code does not contain intentionally malicious software, but I
>> don't know the details of that statement.
>>
>> In any case, if possible, let's focus on the Infra side of this here.
>> We should separately review the language of any agreements we need to
>> sign with Legal Affairs and/or the Board.
>>
>
> Technically I don't imagine there's much question here.  You guys
> already have code that builds+signs, the ONLY thing it's missing is a
> file containing an X509 signing cert signed by somebody whom Windows
> trusts by default, right?  Once we obtain such a file, is there any
> reason we won't be able to put it on a VM and run your code inside that
> VM against that file?  I expect not, so I'm moving on to the legal
> sides.
>

The remaining question would be if we need any safeguards against
hypothetical compromised committer accounts.

I think we want to avoid something like this:

1) Someone acquires login credentials for a committer, e.g., they use
the same password at Apache as they use for some other web service
that is hacked.

2) They check-in a backdoor into the code

3) Before CTR finds the problem the buildbots have built and signed
the executables and the hacker has downloaded them.

4) We have malicious code now distributed signed with the Apache certificate.

So from a process view, we might want to have routine builds be signed
with a placeholder test certificate (essentially self-signed) and this
test certificate is in SVN.    The real signing certificate would only
be applied on Release Candidates and with additional safeguards.
Maybe the request needs to come from the PMC Chair or the Release
Manager?  Or some time must elapse between the date of the SVN
revision and the signing?

You might think that we'd vote on the RC and only sign it after that.
But that doesn't work because the signature is applied at multiple
levels of the packaging.  So the individual EXE and DLL's are signed,
as well as the installer and the outermost archive packaging.

One option would be to vote to approve the RC and then rebuild the
exact same revision that was approved, with no other changes than
replacing the test cert with the real signing cert.

> And yes, I do need to at least think of the legal side before I start:
> if, say, Company X's terms include a use-in-advertising license and VP
> Brand vetoes that, then there's no point in burning Infra cycles on
> thinking of how to make it work with Company X.
>

Dennis gave a link to the Symantec agreement.  I don't see any
trademark or advertising related clause.  But we obviously need to
make a thorough review.  There are other CA's as well who might offer
different terms.

Regards,

-Rob

>> Regards,
>>
>> -Rob

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