Return-Path: X-Original-To: apmail-tomcat-users-archive@www.apache.org Delivered-To: apmail-tomcat-users-archive@www.apache.org Received: from mail.apache.org (hermes.apache.org [140.211.11.3]) by minotaur.apache.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 88222E49D for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2013 15:14:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 68363 invoked by uid 500); 8 Feb 2013 15:14:01 -0000 Delivered-To: apmail-tomcat-users-archive@tomcat.apache.org Received: (qmail 68307 invoked by uid 500); 8 Feb 2013 15:14:00 -0000 Mailing-List: contact users-help@tomcat.apache.org; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Post: List-Id: Reply-To: "Tomcat Users List" Delivered-To: mailing list users@tomcat.apache.org Received: (qmail 68289 invoked by uid 99); 8 Feb 2013 15:14:00 -0000 Received: from minotaur.apache.org (HELO minotaur.apache.org) (140.211.11.9) by apache.org (qpsmtpd/0.29) with ESMTP; Fri, 08 Feb 2013 15:14:00 +0000 Received: from localhost (HELO [192.168.23.9]) (127.0.0.1) (smtp-auth username markt, mechanism plain) by minotaur.apache.org (qpsmtpd/0.29) with ESMTP; Fri, 08 Feb 2013 15:14:00 +0000 Message-ID: <5115162F.7060106@apache.org> Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2013 15:13:51 +0000 From: Mark Thomas User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130107 Thunderbird/17.0.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Tomcat Users List Subject: Re: How to limit the number of renegotiations for a single TLS / SSL connection References: In-Reply-To: X-Enigmail-Version: 1.5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 08/02/2013 14:28, dkumar@ccilindia.co.in wrote: > Hello All, > > We are using - > Tomcat Version - 6.0.18 > Operating System Version : HP-UX 11.31 > SSL Version - OpenSSL 0.9.8k 25 Mar 2009 > Port - 8443 > > By running the venerability assessment test we are getting the following > observation > > The remote service encrypts traffic using TLS / SSL and permits clients to > renegotiate connections. The computational requirements for renegotiating > a connection are asymmetrical between the client and the server, with the > server performing several times more work. Since the remote host does not > appear to limit the number of renegotiations for a single TLS / SSL > connection, this permits a client to open several simultaneous connections > and repeatedly renegotiate them, possibly leading to a denial of service > condition. > > Please suggest the recommended solution for tomcat To repeat what I have said privately on this topic: The Apache Tomcat security team has reviewed the available information for CVE-2011-1473 and has performed some testing of Apache Tomcat using one of the many tools that has be written to demonstrate this issue. Our conclusions are: - In terms of CPU usage there is not a large difference (same order of magnitude) between a client creating multiple HTTPS connections and a client creating a single HTTPS connection and repeatedly requesting renegotiation. This is consistent with the findings / opinions of the numerous SSL/TLS experts that have commented on this issue. - Repeated renegotiation attempts from a single client can be detected by a firewall. - Multiple connection attempts from a client are easier for a firewall to identify than multiple renegotiation requests. - Client renegotiation is not permitted by the HTTP APR/native connector. - It would be possible to add renegotiation rate limiting to the HTTP BIO and NIO connectors but there is not a clear-cut case for doing this. We would also draw your attention to the following text on the Apache Tomcat website security pages [1]: Note that all networked servers are subject to denial of service attacks, and we cannot promise magic workarounds to generic problems (such as a client streaming lots of data to your server, or re-requesting the same URL repeatedly). In general our philosophy is to avoid any attacks which can cause the server to consume resources in a non-linear relationship to the size of inputs. Further discussion of this issue, particularly the usefulness of adding renegotiation rate-limiting to the the HTTP BIO and NIO connectors, should take place on the public Tomcat users mailing list. Mark on behalf of the Apache Tomcat security team With all the above in mind is there an argument for introducing renegotiation rate limiting for BIO and NIO? Or do we just say if you are bothered about CVE-2011-1473, use APR. Mark --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscribe@tomcat.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: users-help@tomcat.apache.org