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Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2009 12:45:32 -0800
Message-ID: <96e4b5230911071245s21dbd4f5ud1ad59cf66271d9c@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: SSL & Tomcat
From: Costin Manolache <costin@gmail.com>
To: Tomcat Developers List <dev@tomcat.apache.org>
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On Sat, Nov 7, 2009 at 8:59 AM, Mark Thomas <markt@apache.org> wrote:

> All,
>
> I was thinking about this on my way back from ApacheCon and we probably
> need to get some advice out to users early next week.
>
> My current understanding is that the MITM attack is triggered by a
> renegotiation.
>
> On this basis I suggest something along the following lines:
>
> SSL using JSSE (BIO and NIO connectors)
> - Don't use SSL configs that require renegotiation. i.e. SSL config
> should be the same for the entire host. Sites that require SSL in some
> places and SSL + CLIENT-CERT in others will require reconfiguration.
> Sites that require SSL for some parts should be OK.
>


IMO we could disable ACTION_REQ_SSL_CERTIFICATE ( with a flag
"allowManInMiddle" or completely ).


- Keep watch for a Sun update to the JDK that may help address the issue
>
>
Or ask people to switch to tcNative ( i.e. openSSL ) or stop using client
cert auth.


> SSL using tc Native
> - tcnative does not support renegotiation
> (https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46950) so for now
> users of tc native with SSL should be OK
>
>
> We also need to think about what to do with tc native. Maybe something
> like:
> - release 1.1.17 with binaries built with 0.9.8l (so renegotiation is
> disabled)
> - keep an eye on httpd and if they find a work-around, copy it and
> release 1.1.18 with renegotiation enabled
>
>

> For now, I'm not proposing any changes to the docs although we may want
> to put a summary of the advice - once agreed - on the security pages.
>
> Thoughts?
>
>
How about the cypher suites - I don't think we allow per-context config of
allowed cyphers.

Also not sure about client-initiated re-negotiation - I guess using a fixed
openssl ( do they have
a fix ? ) and native would avoid this, otherwise we need to wait for a jsse
fix ?

Costin

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