Return-Path: Delivered-To: apmail-jakarta-tomcat-dev-archive@jakarta.apache.org Received: (qmail 89774 invoked by uid 500); 1 Aug 2001 18:14:16 -0000 Mailing-List: contact tomcat-dev-help@jakarta.apache.org; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk list-help: list-unsubscribe: list-post: Reply-To: tomcat-dev@jakarta.apache.org Delivered-To: mailing list tomcat-dev@jakarta.apache.org Received: (qmail 89749 invoked from network); 1 Aug 2001 18:14:16 -0000 Message-ID: <3B6846EB.59C1E865@mhsoftware.com> Date: Wed, 01 Aug 2001 12:14:03 -0600 From: Christopher Cain X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.75 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en,pdf MIME-Version: 1.0 To: tomcat-dev@jakarta.apache.org Subject: Re: [PROPOSAL] Standalone SSL References: <3B68376A.C80204C3@mhsoftware.com> <3B684080.AA75F1EA@fujitsu-siemens.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Rating: h31.sny.collab.net 1.6.2 0/1000/N jean-frederic clere wrote: > > Encrypting server certificates is not bad but it prevents starting the server > automaticly. > Storing this password is a nonsense. > OpenSSL (for example) allows to modify this password or to have no password. > If the server certificates is encrypted then we should prompt for the password. > Of course this password should be independant for the other passwords used in > the system... > > If you are afraid having user passwords stored in the machine you should use > "user certificates" or something like that.... > (I will go on tomorrow if the thread is still active ;-)) We're in agreement. My initial thought was that either the cert is encrypted (the secure approach) or not encrypted (the insecure approach), and if encrypted you are prompted for the password. Since storing the password in server.xml is essentially the equivalent of not encryptng it at all, I assumed that we would want to keep the current approach in place as the "insecure" option both for backwards compatibility and since the "keytool -genkey" method (which obviously generates an encrypted keystore) is easy for end users to do. I would have no objections to the encrypted vs. unencrypted approach you describe, but that's why I didn't propose it. As far as the thread still being active tomorrow, I promise I won't let it die without either a resolution or a fight ;-) - Christopher