Return-Path: Mailing-List: contact tomcat-dev-help@jakarta.apache.org; run by ezmlm Delivered-To: mailing list tomcat-dev@jakarta.apache.org Received: (qmail 62210 invoked from network); 3 Jul 2000 21:21:17 -0000 Received: from emily.cs.bham.ac.uk (147.188.192.10) by locus.apache.org with SMTP; 3 Jul 2000 21:21:17 -0000 Received: from jock.cs.bham.ac.uk by emily.cs.bham.ac.uk (Exim 3.11 #1) with esmtp id 139Ddb-0002W2-00 for tomcat-dev@jakarta.apache.org; Mon, 03 Jul 2000 22:20:19 +0100 Received: by jock.cs.bham.ac.uk (8.9.1b+Sun/client/2.0) id WAA08180; Mon, 3 Jul 2000 22:21:23 +0100 (BST) From: Alan P Sexton MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2000 22:21:22 +0100 (BST) To: tomcat-dev@jakarta.apache.org Subject: Big security problem with Admin context in Tomcat? X-Mailer: VM 6.43 under 20.4 "Emerald" XEmacs Lucid Message-ID: <14688.62089.123872.142107@jock.cs.bham.ac.uk> X-Spam-Rating: locus.apache.org 1.6.2 0/1000/N I am new to Tomcat and have just installed v3.1 on a WinNT4.0 system. Maybe I am missing something but: out of the box it has a /admin context. Connect to /admin and add a new context, say Context Path /z docBase C:\ The admin servlet does not appear to do any authentication that the invoker has any rights to do this (other than the file permissions of the user account under which tomcat is running) but it succeeds and lets me read anything on the C: drive of the server machine. (I have tried this from other accounts over the web) You can also remove a container without any apparent checks and so shut down any servlets or the whole server. I presume this is not supposed to happen. While I can easily remove the admin context, I am concerned with 2 issues: 1: The admin context is available by default in the 3.1 tomcat distribution with no warning. 2: Even if /admin is not available, the tomcat API supports an admin style servlet that can modify the contexts in this way. I can think of a number of ways that this could be used by virus or trojan horse writers, particularly if people start distributing servlets, beans or packages such as the O'Reilly one. However, this may not be an issue because of the unsecured nature of servlets anyway (I am aware of servlet sandboxes but I do not think they are a solution to this problem). -- Alan P. Sexton, University of Birmingham Tel: 0121-414 3703 School of Computer Science Fax: 0121-414 4281 Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, England Email: A.P.Sexton@cs.bham.ac.uk