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From "Andreas Kohn (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (SHIRO-550) Pre-authentication deserialization vulnerability
Date Thu, 19 Nov 2015 16:22:11 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SHIRO-550?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=15013781#comment-15013781
] 

Andreas Kohn commented on SHIRO-550:
------------------------------------

I'm in a similar situation: our application doesn't need/use/want remember-me functionality.


For me to fix the problem at its core it seems I just need to ensure that we're using a different
serializer, and/or that the security manager is configured with a dummy RememberMeManager.

For Shiro in general it seems these steps would be sensible:
1. Change the DefaultWebSecurityManager constructor to not set the CookieRememberMeManager,
and
2. Change shiro.ini to explicitly spell out what needs to be done to enable remember-me functionality
(set the manager, and configure the serializer).

Additionally it would also be good to just kill the hardcoded secret, and replace it with
some documentation on how to produce one.


> Pre-authentication deserialization vulnerability
> ------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: SHIRO-550
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SHIRO-550
>             Project: Shiro
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: RememberMe
>    Affects Versions: 1.2.4
>            Reporter: Tim Stibbs
>
> The way shiro is set up by default exposes a web application to deserialization attacks.
This is dangerous anyway, but particularly in light of the recent exploits using commons-collections
(see http://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/
for more info).
> By default, shiro uses the {{CookieRememberMeManager}}. This serializes, encrypts and
encodes the users identity for later retrieval. Therefore, when it receives a request from
an unauthenticated user, it looks for their remembered identity by doing the following:
> * Retrieve the value of the {{rememberMe}} cookie
> * Base 64 decode
> * Decrypt using AES
> * Deserialize using java serialization ({{ObjectInputStream}}).
> However, the default encryption key is hardcoded, meaning anyone with access to the source
code knows what the default encryption key is. So, an attacker can create a malicious object,
serialize it, encode it, then send it as a cookie. Shiro will then decode and deserialize,
meaning that your malicious object is now live on the server. With careful construction of
the objects, they can be made to run some malicious code (see link above for more detail).
> Note this is not theoretical; I have a working exploit using the [ysoserial commons-collections4
exploit|https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/blob/master/src/main/java/ysoserial/payloads/CommonsCollections2.java]
and http client. I can provide my test code if required.
> I understand that this requires your shiro to be set up using the default remember me
settings, but in my case my application doesn't even make use of the remember me functionality
(there’s no way for the user to ask to be remembered), so I didn't even consider that I
needed to secure this part. Yet, my application still has this vulnerability.



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