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From "jason marshall" <jdmarsh...@gmail.com>
Subject Re: DO NOT REPLY [Bug 40921] - XML <X509Certificate> contents modified and signature normallly validated.
Date Wed, 08 Nov 2006 16:41:33 GMT
On 11/8/06, Sean Mullan <Sean.Mullan@sun.com> wrote:
> jason marshall wrote:
> > Maybe I'm misunderstanding the commentary made so far in this bug report.
> >
> > If KeyInfo is indeed advisory, then how does one establish the
> > trustworthiness of an enveloped signature?
>
> The relying (validating) party still needs to determine the
> trustworthiness of the KeyInfo material, or the key that it used to
> validate the signature (does the signing key actually belong to someone
> I trust?). For example if KeyInfo contains an X509Certificate then you
> shouldn't blindly trust the certificate, you need to determine if you
> trust the CA that issued that certificate - for example by building a
> chain of certificates from a trust anchor and validating the certificate
> chain (checking if certs have not been revoked, etc). XML Signature does
> not define how this is done, it is up to the application. However, there
> are CertPath APIs in the JDK which already help you do this: see
> http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/guide/security/certpath/CertPathProgGuide.html
> for more information.
>

Yes, of course.  My question is, if the KeyInfo in a valid signature
can be changed without failing the signature check, then what good
does it do me to check the chain of trust on the KeyInfo?

I presume this behavior is implemented as specced by the W3C.  I'm
just wondering what the solution was to this problem if the above
isn't actually sufficient.


-Jason


> --Sean
>
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Jason
> >
> > On 11/7/06, bugzilla@apache.org <bugzilla@apache.org> wrote:
> >> ------- Additional Comments From cantor.2@osu.edu  2006-11-07 21:18
> >> -------
> >> An enveloped signature omits anything inside the Signature element
> >> apart from
> >> SignedInfo. KeyInfo is not commonly signed. The only attack possible
> >> is against
> >> broken software that doesn't understand that KeyInfo is advisory, not
> >> trusted
> >> information.
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Configure bugmail:
> >> http://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/userprefs.cgi?tab=email
> >> ------- You are receiving this mail because: -------
> >> You are the assignee for the bug, or are watching the assignee.
> >>
> >
> >
>
>


-- 
- Jason

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