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From Michael McGrady <mmcgr...@topiatechnology.com>
Subject Re: Towards Internet Jini Services (trust)
Date Fri, 01 Oct 2010 18:02:39 GMT
Might be helpful - a little nightstand reading.

http://www.csl.sri.com/~neumann/chats4.pdf


On Oct 1, 2010, at 8:52 AM, Gregg Wonderly wrote:

> On 10/1/2010 4:39 AM, Sim IJskes - QCG wrote:
>> On 09/29/2010 11:45 PM, Gregg Wonderly wrote:
>>> For myself, the primary consideration is whether the arguments in RPC
>>> calls are actually "downloaded classes" vs "downloaded data". In the
>>> simple sense, "downloaded classes" are "downloaded data".
>> 
>> I agree with you. A downloaded class is a specialization of downloaded data. Or
>> maybe even not, but lets not go there.
>> 
>> In general terms, a class has more degrees of freedom than data. Because a class
>> is executed by a turing complete state machine and most of the time the machine
>> executing data is less complete.
> 
> Trust is what I was trying to point at.  People download XML, Javascript on web pages,
zip archives, executable programs and all kinds of things what at some point the data, becomes
"the semantic meaning" and gets used by some "machinery" to cause action.
> 
> There is never validation done about anything more than structure (DtD, schema) of things
like XML, or "machine magic number" for executables etc.  Only some simple evaluation of "will
the machine accept this input" is done.
> 
> With Jini, people are constantly burdened by the whole idea of "what can we trust about
this code", or "how can we prove no harm will come".
> 
> The answer is that only through exhaustive means can you do that for any instance of
"the downloaded code", and what httpmd: and other similar things are about, is "identifying
a version" that has been "evaluated" to be "what you expect".
> 
> Web sites publishing source code, binary distributions and other things that need to
be trustworthy, also publish "hashes" of the "contents" to help people evaluate that they
have "the right stuff".
> 
> So, I think we have ample ability to provide people multiple levels of trust assertion
and trust evaluation already.
> 
> The problem is that we really feel like it needs to be "individual permissions" because
that's the "tightest security model" that we can see and it seems very attractive to use it.
 In the end, there are places where that is necessary, but more often than not, it is a large
barrier which makes it very difficult to say "I trust the code" trivially.
> 
> For example, we don't have mechanisms which would allow a ServiceUI client, to "see"
a service in the registrar, and only after seeing it and its source, signify trust, and then
download code.  The original design has always been around the concept of "you start the VM
with the trust asserted" and then it can only do what you've entrusted it with.
> 
> We need a lot more dynamics so that we can really see how hard it is to create real,
working mechanisms for dynamically changing the trust relationships between the clients and
the services.  And it needs to work remotely so that I can tell a service that it can use
another service through administrative interfaces.
> 
> Gregg Wonderly
> 
>> My personal view on this matter revolves around the burden it puts on the user.
>> When i download code and run its installer, i trust the code to well behave.
>> When i run the installer i make one big trust decision. I can audit the files
>> installed if i'm really paranoid, or a security researcher. When i run my jini
>> application, it connects to some registry, downloads a jar into memory and
>> executes it. This jar can be same as yesterday or it might not. I can't tell.
>> Does it perform the same function?
>> 
>> The basic components are the same, but i see distinct differences. Do you see
>> this agility to take off in a corporate environment?
>> 
>> Gr. Sim
>> 
> 

Michael McGrady
Chief Architect
Topia Technology, Inc.
Cel 1.253.720.3365
Work 1.253.572.9712 extension 2037
mmcgrady@topiatechnology.com




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