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From "Hudson (JIRA)" <>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (PHOENIX-4533) Phoenix Query Server should not use SPNEGO principal to proxy user requests
Date Tue, 13 Feb 2018 19:06:00 GMT


Hudson commented on PHOENIX-4533:

FAILURE: Integrated in Jenkins build Phoenix-master #1936 (See [])
PHOENIX-4533 Modified Query Server to use two sets of Kerberos (elserj: rev a71c4b7e3c11f1c7d1955b51929ad65b252feb62)
* (edit) phoenix-queryserver/src/it/java/org/apache/phoenix/end2end/
* (edit) phoenix-core/src/main/java/org/apache/phoenix/query/
* (edit) phoenix-queryserver/src/main/java/org/apache/phoenix/queryserver/server/
* (edit) phoenix-queryserver/src/it/java/org/apache/phoenix/end2end/

> Phoenix Query Server should not use SPNEGO principal to proxy user requests
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>                 Key: PHOENIX-4533
>                 URL:
>             Project: Phoenix
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>            Reporter: Lev Bronshtein
>            Assignee: Lev Bronshtein
>            Priority: Minor
>             Fix For: 5.0.0, 4.14.0
>         Attachments: PHOENIX-4533.1.patch, PHOENIX-4533.2.patch, PHOENIX-4533.3.patch,
> Currently the HTTP/ principal is used by various components in the HADOOP ecosystem to
perform SPNEGO authentication.  Since there can only be one HTTP/ per host, even outside
of the Hadoop ecosystem, the keytab containing key material for local HTTP/ principal is shared
among a few applications.  With so many applications having access to the HTTP/ credentials,
this increases the chances of an attack on the proxy user capabilities of Hadoop.  This JIRA
proposes that two different key tabs can be used to
> 1. Authenticate kerberized web requests
> 2. Communicate with the phoenix back end

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