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From "Josh Elser (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Assigned] (PHOENIX-4533) Phoenix Query Server should not use SPNEGO principal to proxy user requests
Date Wed, 24 Jan 2018 20:54:00 GMT

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4533?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
]

Josh Elser reassigned PHOENIX-4533:
-----------------------------------

    Assignee: Lev Bronshtein

> Phoenix Query Server should not use SPNEGO principal to proxy user requests
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: PHOENIX-4533
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4533
>             Project: Phoenix
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>            Reporter: Lev Bronshtein
>            Assignee: Lev Bronshtein
>            Priority: Minor
>         Attachments: PHOENIX-4533.1.patch
>
>
> Currently the HTTP/ principal is used by various components in the HADOOP ecosystem to
perform SPNEGO authentication.  Since there can only be one HTTP/ per host, even outside
of the Hadoop ecosystem, the keytab containing key material for local HTTP/ principal is shared
among a few applications.  With so many applications having access to the HTTP/ credentials,
this increases the chances of an attack on the proxy user capabilities of Hadoop.  This JIRA
proposes that two different key tabs can be used to
> 1. Authenticate kerberized web requests
> 2. Communicate with the phoenix back end



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