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From "Ankit Singhal (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (PHOENIX-4198) Remove the need for users to have access to the Phoenix SYSTEM tables to create tables
Date Mon, 09 Oct 2017 14:27:00 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4198?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16197052#comment-16197052
] 

Ankit Singhal commented on PHOENIX-4198:
----------------------------------------

I'm not sure we should require that a user who creates an index or view have read and exec
access on the parent table as well as all indexes on the parent table. Its possible that we
might have a user that only executes ddl commands.
bq. User need READ(and EXEC) access on data table to build the index, although it may not
hold true for async indexes if they are built by another user. And, the purpose why user requires
READ access on data table, is to restrict from anybody to create views(As we don't have any
other special permission in HBase for logical entities).

bq. In PhoenixAccessController.authorizeOrGrantAccessToUsers should the boolean haveAccess=false
be within the loop on requiredActionsOnTable ?
yep, Thanks

bq. Also when you check if the user already has the action in {{if (permToTable.implies(action))
{}} should you also check that the permToTable.getUser() equals userPermission.getUser() ?
Actually, we are only getting the table permission of particular user of data table only.
so, we don't need to check it again.
{code}
List<UserPermission> permsToTable = getPermissionForUser(permissionsOnTheTable,userPermission.getUser());
{code}

bq. Can you add a test that verifies that users that have access the data table also have
access to an index after its created?
Added a test for the same in a new patch(v4).

> Remove the need for users to have access to the Phoenix SYSTEM tables to create tables
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: PHOENIX-4198
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4198
>             Project: Phoenix
>          Issue Type: Bug
>            Reporter: Ankit Singhal
>            Assignee: Ankit Singhal
>              Labels: namespaces
>             Fix For: 4.13.0
>
>         Attachments: PHOENIX-4198.patch, PHOENIX-4198_v2.patch, PHOENIX-4198_v3.patch
>
>
> Problem statement:-
> A user who doesn't have access to a table should also not be able to modify  Phoenix
Metadata. Currently, every user required to have a write permission to SYSTEM tables which
is a security concern as they can create/alter/drop/corrupt meta data of any other table without
proper access to the corresponding physical tables.
> [~devaraj] recommended a solution as below.
> 1. A coprocessor endpoint would be implemented and all write accesses to the catalog
table would have to necessarily go through that. The 'hbase' user would own that table. Today,
there is MetaDataEndpointImpl that's run on the RS where the catalog is hosted, and that could
be enhanced to serve the purpose we need.
> 2. The regionserver hosting the catalog table would do the needful for all catalog updates
- creating the mutations as needed, that is.
> 3. The coprocessor endpoint could use Ranger to do necessary authorization checks before
updating the catalog table. So for example, if a user doesn't have authorization to create
a table in a certain namespace, or update the schema, etc., it can reject such requests outright.
Only after successful validations, does it perform the operations (physical operations to
do with creating the table, and updating the catalog table with the necessary mutations).
> 4. In essence, the code that implements dealing with DDLs, would be hosted in the catalog
table endpoint. The client code would be really thin, and it would just invoke the endpoint
with the necessary info. The additional thing that needs to be done in the endpoint is the
validation of authorization to prevent unauthorized users from making changes to someone else's
tables/schemas/etc. For example, one should be able to create a view on a table if he has
read access on the base table. That mutation on the catalog table would be permitted. For
changing the schema (adding a new column for example), the said user would need write permission
on the table... etc etc.
> Thanks [~elserj] for the write-up.



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