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From "Lausen, Leonard" <lau...@amazon.de.INVALID>
Subject Re: [DISCUSS] CI Access Control
Date Wed, 23 Oct 2019 22:55:37 GMT
Hi Marco,

do you mean retriggering PRs should be possible for all members of 
https://github.com/orgs/apache/teams/mxnet-committers/members team? It doesn't
work for me unfortunately (even though I login to the CI via my Github account).
The retrigger button simply doesn't show up.

Are any further steps required?

Best regards
Leonard

On Tue, 2019-09-17 at 14:47 +0200, Marco de Abreu wrote:
> Hi Sheng,
> 
> will I'm in general all in favour of widening the access to distribute the
> tasks, the situation around the CI system in particular is a bit more
> difficult.
> 
> As far as I know, the creation of the CI system is neither automated,
> versioned nor backed up or safeguarded. This means that if somebody makes a
> change that breaks something, we're left with a broken system we can't
> recover from. Thus, I preferred it in the past to restrict the access as
> much as possible (at least to Prod) to avoid these situations from
> happening. While #1 and #2 are already possible today (we have two roles
> for committers and regular users that allow this already), #3 and #4 come
> with a significant risk for the stability of the system.
> 
> As soon as a job is added or changed, a lot of things happen in Jenkins -
> one of these tasks is the SCM scan which tries to determine the branches
> the job should run on. For somebody who is inexperienced, the first pitfall
> is that suddenly hundreds of jobs are being spawned which will certainly
> overload Jenkins and render it unusable. There are a lot of tricks and I
> could elaborate them, but basically the bottom line is that the
> configuration interface of Jenkins is far from fail-proof and exposes a
> significant risk if accessed by somebody who doesn't exactly know what
> they're doing - speak, we would need to design some kind of training and
> even that would not safeguard us from these fatal events.
> 
> There's the whole security aspect around user-facing artifact generation of
> CI/CD and the possibility of them being tampered, but I don't think I have
> to elaborate that.
> 
> With regards to #4 especially, I'd say that the risk of somebody just
> upgrading the system or changing plugins inherits an even bigger risk.
> Plugins are notoriously unsafe and system updates have also shown to not
> really go like a breeze. I'd argue that changes to the system should only
> be done by the administrators of it since they have a bigger overview over
> all the things that are currently going on while also having the full
> access (backups before making changes, SSH access, log access, metric
> access, etc) to debug errors. In the end we shouldn't forget that this is a
> productive system - usually, you'd have nobody being able to touch it at
> all, but we're not in a perfect world, so I'd say we should restrict it to
> a bare minimum in the form of admins.
> 
> So while I certainly understand and encourage to distribute the access, I
> don't feel comfortable widening the access to such a critical productive
> system. It being down means that the GitHub development is fully halted,
> which is really problematic since we don't have rollback mechanisms.
> 
> Best regards,
> marco
> 
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 6:40 AM Sheng Zha <zhasheng@apache.org> wrote:
> 
> > Hi,
> > 
> > I'd like to initiate discussion on how access control should be managed
> > for the CI system. The hope is that we can present the conclusion of this
> > discussion as the recommendation and request to the donors of the CI system
> > from Amazon.
> > 
> > The specific aspects I'd like to discuss are the abilities to:
> > 1. trigger PR validation and nightly jobs.
> > 2. trigger continuous delivery jobs, such as for binary releases in pip,
> > maven, and dockerhub.
> > 3. add jobs to the CI system.
> > 4. maintain and manage the CI system, such as system upgrades and jenkins
> > plugin installation.
> > 
> > Given that we already have GitHub SSO enabled on the Jenkins CI, I suggest
> > the following authentication levels for these items:
> > 1. all authenticated GitHub users.
> > 2-4. all MXNet committers
> > 
> > What do you think? If you have more aspects that you wish to discuss, feel
> > free to propose.
> > 
> > -sz
> > 
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