mxnet-dev mailing list archives

Site index · List index
Message view « Date » · « Thread »
Top « Date » · « Thread »
From Marco de Abreu <marco.g.ab...@gmail.com>
Subject Re: [DISCUSS] CI Access Control
Date Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:11:32 GMT
We can't use the role feature of GitHub, thus committers have to be added
manually by an admin.

Lausen, Leonard <lausen@amazon.de.invalid> schrieb am Do., 24. Okt. 2019,
00:55:

> Hi Marco,
>
> do you mean retriggering PRs should be possible for all members of
> https://github.com/orgs/apache/teams/mxnet-committers/members team? It
> doesn't
> work for me unfortunately (even though I login to the CI via my Github
> account).
> The retrigger button simply doesn't show up.
>
> Are any further steps required?
>
> Best regards
> Leonard
>
> On Tue, 2019-09-17 at 14:47 +0200, Marco de Abreu wrote:
> > Hi Sheng,
> >
> > will I'm in general all in favour of widening the access to distribute
> the
> > tasks, the situation around the CI system in particular is a bit more
> > difficult.
> >
> > As far as I know, the creation of the CI system is neither automated,
> > versioned nor backed up or safeguarded. This means that if somebody
> makes a
> > change that breaks something, we're left with a broken system we can't
> > recover from. Thus, I preferred it in the past to restrict the access as
> > much as possible (at least to Prod) to avoid these situations from
> > happening. While #1 and #2 are already possible today (we have two roles
> > for committers and regular users that allow this already), #3 and #4 come
> > with a significant risk for the stability of the system.
> >
> > As soon as a job is added or changed, a lot of things happen in Jenkins -
> > one of these tasks is the SCM scan which tries to determine the branches
> > the job should run on. For somebody who is inexperienced, the first
> pitfall
> > is that suddenly hundreds of jobs are being spawned which will certainly
> > overload Jenkins and render it unusable. There are a lot of tricks and I
> > could elaborate them, but basically the bottom line is that the
> > configuration interface of Jenkins is far from fail-proof and exposes a
> > significant risk if accessed by somebody who doesn't exactly know what
> > they're doing - speak, we would need to design some kind of training and
> > even that would not safeguard us from these fatal events.
> >
> > There's the whole security aspect around user-facing artifact generation
> of
> > CI/CD and the possibility of them being tampered, but I don't think I
> have
> > to elaborate that.
> >
> > With regards to #4 especially, I'd say that the risk of somebody just
> > upgrading the system or changing plugins inherits an even bigger risk.
> > Plugins are notoriously unsafe and system updates have also shown to not
> > really go like a breeze. I'd argue that changes to the system should only
> > be done by the administrators of it since they have a bigger overview
> over
> > all the things that are currently going on while also having the full
> > access (backups before making changes, SSH access, log access, metric
> > access, etc) to debug errors. In the end we shouldn't forget that this
> is a
> > productive system - usually, you'd have nobody being able to touch it at
> > all, but we're not in a perfect world, so I'd say we should restrict it
> to
> > a bare minimum in the form of admins.
> >
> > So while I certainly understand and encourage to distribute the access, I
> > don't feel comfortable widening the access to such a critical productive
> > system. It being down means that the GitHub development is fully halted,
> > which is really problematic since we don't have rollback mechanisms.
> >
> > Best regards,
> > marco
> >
> > On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 6:40 AM Sheng Zha <zhasheng@apache.org> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > I'd like to initiate discussion on how access control should be managed
> > > for the CI system. The hope is that we can present the conclusion of
> this
> > > discussion as the recommendation and request to the donors of the CI
> system
> > > from Amazon.
> > >
> > > The specific aspects I'd like to discuss are the abilities to:
> > > 1. trigger PR validation and nightly jobs.
> > > 2. trigger continuous delivery jobs, such as for binary releases in
> pip,
> > > maven, and dockerhub.
> > > 3. add jobs to the CI system.
> > > 4. maintain and manage the CI system, such as system upgrades and
> jenkins
> > > plugin installation.
> > >
> > > Given that we already have GitHub SSO enabled on the Jenkins CI, I
> suggest
> > > the following authentication levels for these items:
> > > 1. all authenticated GitHub users.
> > > 2-4. all MXNet committers
> > >
> > > What do you think? If you have more aspects that you wish to discuss,
> feel
> > > free to propose.
> > >
> > > -sz
> > >
>

Mime
  • Unnamed multipart/alternative (inline, None, 0 bytes)
View raw message