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From "Anindya Sinha (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (MESOS-6953) A compromised mesos-master node can execute code as root on agents.
Date Tue, 07 Feb 2017 00:30:41 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MESOS-6953?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=15855046#comment-15855046
] 

Anindya Sinha commented on MESOS-6953:
--------------------------------------

For the immediate issue at hand, the proposal is to configure {{acls}} to add a new acl type
for the agent (currently, this acl type is only supported on the master), viz. {{run_tasks}}
to denote users allowed to run tasks on the agent. Note that as far as deployment goes, the
{{run_tasks}} acl should be present in every agent in the cluster and should match with the
{{run_tasks}} acl configured on the master.

In {{acls}}, a global flag {{permissive}} defines the following:
It defines the behavior when no ACL applies to the request made. If set to true (which is
the default) it will allow by default all non-matching requests, if set to false it will reject
all non-matching requests.

If no {{run_tasks}} acl is specified when {{permissive}} is {{true}} (default), all users
shall be allowed to launch tasks. However, if {{permissive}} is {{false}} and no {{run_tasks}}
acl is configured, it would imply no user would be able to launch tasks which is due to the
very definition of the global {{permissive}} flag, and operators would need to configure the
{{run_tasks}} acl before upgrading (if {{permissive}} is {{false}}).

One way to enhance this condition to have the notion of {{permissive}} for each acl type (instead
of a global {{permissive}}). Opened https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MESOS-7066 for that
issue.

> A compromised mesos-master node can execute code as root on agents.
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: MESOS-6953
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MESOS-6953
>             Project: Mesos
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: security
>            Reporter: Anindya Sinha
>            Assignee: Anindya Sinha
>              Labels: security, slave
>
> mesos-master has a `--[no-]root_submissions` flag that controls whether frameworks with
`root` user are admitted to the cluster.
> However, if a mesos-master node is compromised, it can attempt to schedule tasks on agent
as the `root` user. Since mesos-agent has no check against tasks running on the agent for
specific users, tasks can get run with `root` privileges can get run within the container
on the agent.



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