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From "Dennis E. Hamilton" <orc...@apache.org>
Subject RE: svn commit: r1377482 - /incubator/ooo/trunk/main/external_deps.lst
Date Sun, 26 Aug 2012 20:08:31 GMT
I haven't said anything about modifications to an upstream source.  That's an entirely different
problem.

I'm talking about dependencies on someone else's binaries of any kind. 

 - Dennis

PS: In my own analysis, I probably should have mentioned bundled extensions too, although
that seems to be a rather AOO-specific case.  At some point, the entire extension provenance
and authenticity case *will* come under scrutiny.

-----Original Message-----
From: Dave Fisher [mailto:dave2wave@comcast.net] 
Sent: Sunday, August 26, 2012 12:57
To: ooo-dev@incubator.apache.org
Subject: Re: svn commit: r1377482 - /incubator/ooo/trunk/main/external_deps.lst


On Aug 26, 2012, at 12:47 PM, Dennis E. Hamilton wrote:

> +1 on preserving the provenance and integrity of binary dependencies.
> 
> I'd go with external signatures *and* hosting the specific artifacts on a reliable ASF
location for preservation along with all ASF project sources that depended on those specific
artifacts in any sort of review, release of authenticated binaries, etc.

There is nothing to say that we can't make our modifications with code from svn and base code
stored in a reliable location. We can then push this to either extras and/or maven central.

Regards,
Dave

> 
> - Dennis
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Rob Weir [mailto:robweir@apache.org] 
> Sent: Sunday, August 26, 2012 12:38
> To: ooo-dev@incubator.apache.org
> Subject: Re: svn commit: r1377482 - /incubator/ooo/trunk/main/external_deps.lst
> 
> On Sun, Aug 26, 2012 at 3:20 PM, Dave Fisher <dave2wave@comcast.net> wrote:
>> Hi,
>> 
>> We need to do more work to have proper compliance with Apache Infrastructure policy
in managing external dependencies.
>> 
>> I may not be precisely correct and am looking for confirmation, but In general i
think we need to
>> 
>> (1) Completely avoid using svn.apache.org. I don't think we are allowed to do this
even as a backup URL.
>> 
>> (2) Use mirrors or maven for ASF dependencies where we use the current release. If
we use mirrors then archive.apache.org should be the backup for the mirror so that we aren't
in trouble if the project has a release. If a maven repository were used then there would
be no issue.
>> 
>> (3) If we use mirrors then we should allow the user to choose which mirror.
>> 
>> If we decide to take the time to go the maven route. I can use the example of ant
and maven repos from the Apache POI build.xml.
>> 
>> Notes about maven repos. Infra [1], maven central [2] and example of an externally
hosted repo [3]
>> 
>> This area needs careful attention.
>> 
> 
> Note that this move is exactly the wrong thing to do if we want have
> buildbots build binaries that are assumed to be safe and therefore
> signable.  Instead of the security and verifiability of ASF-run host,
> we're putting the dependencies off to a dozen different remote sites,
> with no visibility into their site's mechanisms for vetting changes,
> access controls, auditability of changes, even basics like ensuring
> domain names are renewed and not poached by others.
> 
> Do we really think other websites are as secure as the ones that Infra
> operates?  If so we should move the source code to the other sites as
> well, right?
> 
> No easy resolution of this, but we might mitigate the risk by putting
> all of the dependencies to Apache-Extras and load from there
> primarily.  And if at all possible make sure all change notifications
> from there get echoed to the ooo-committs lis.   We have a better
> chance of exercising now screwing up if we control rather than having
> multiple 3rd parties control.
> 
> Another option would be to use cryptographic means to ensure the
> integrity of the remote dependencies, e.g., detached signatures. That
> doesn't protect us from another website going down, temporarily or
> permanently, but it does allow us to verify that what we are
> downloading has not been tampered with.
> 
> -Rob
> 
> 
>> The current script is here: main/solenv/bin/download_external_dependencies.pl
>> 
>> Regards,
>> Dave
>> 
>> [1] http://apache.org/dev/repository-faq.html  and
>> [2] http://maven.apache.org/guides/mini/guide-central-repository-upload.html
>> [3] http://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2/javax/activation/activation/1.0.2/activation-1.0.2.pom
>> 
>> 
>> On Aug 26, 2012, at 11:58 AM, wave@apache.org wrote:
>> 
>>> Author: wave
>>> Date: Sun Aug 26 18:58:08 2012
>>> New Revision: 1377482
>>> 
>>> URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?rev=1377482&view=rev
>>> Log:
>>> one more small step to infra compliance. still to do removing use of svn as a
backup and for current releases of ASF software the archive is not proper - either a mirror
or the maven repository is required.
>>> 
>>> Modified:
>>>   incubator/ooo/trunk/main/external_deps.lst
>>> 
>>> Modified: incubator/ooo/trunk/main/external_deps.lst
>>> URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/incubator/ooo/trunk/main/external_deps.lst?rev=1377482&r1=1377481&r2=1377482&view=diff
>>> ==============================================================================
>>> --- incubator/ooo/trunk/main/external_deps.lst (original)
>>> +++ incubator/ooo/trunk/main/external_deps.lst Sun Aug 26 18:58:08 2012
>>> @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ if ( true )
>>> if (SOLAR_JAVA == TRUE)
>>>    MD5 = 17960f35b2239654ba608cf1f3e256b3
>>>    name = lucene-2.9.4-src.tar.gz
>>> -    URL1 = http://www.us.apache.org/dist/lucene/java/2.9.4/lucene-2.9.4-src.tar.gz
>>> +    URL1 = http://archive.apache.org/dist/lucene/java/2.9.4/lucene-2.9.4-src.tar.gz
>>>    URL2 = $(OOO_EXTRAS)$(MD5)-$(name)
>>>    # Fall back to a version in SVN from a previous revsion.
>>>    URL3 = http://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/!svn/bc/1337615/incubator/ooo/trunk/ext_sources/$(MD5)-$(name)
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 


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