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From Jim Jagielski <>
Subject Re: Suexec permissions question
Date Mon, 29 Feb 2016 12:06:22 GMT

> On Feb 26, 2016, at 7:50 PM, wrote:
> This is not a question on how to use suexec, that's fairly clear.  The strict, hardwired
conditions its willing to suexec under are also spelled out pretty clear.  My question is
the nature of these requirements -- why they're the way they are.  The user and group requirements
> suexec insists that the file being executed needs to be the same owner and group as what
the web server will be running as after suexec.  Doesn't this requirement make things *less*
secure?  You can't really protect a file against its own owner overwriting it.  The same requirement
is on the folder, leaving the web server two legal chmods away from allowing an exploit to
create, delete, and modify files inside the vhost at will.

Those conditions are hardly unique. The other major suexec-like
script, cgiwrapd, also had the same set of conditions and

First of all, the idea is that the admin "trusts" whatever users are
allowed to use suexec. It's also understood that the risk associated
is directly related to how well tied-down the user account itself
is. Finally, it's to ensure that when running as 'foo:bar", I can
only access files that are owned by 'foo:bar'. If I am 'foo:bar'
and I am trying to run a file owned by 'kirk:trek' then something
is hinky, and we don't want to allow it.
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