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From Rainer Jung <>
Subject Re: half-OT: heartbleed CVE-2014-0160
Date Wed, 09 Apr 2014 19:42:36 GMT
On 09.04.2014 18:05, Reindl Harald wrote:
> Am 09.04.2014 17:41, schrieb William A. Rowe Jr.:
>> Combined with typical ssl session shmcb ... That single process still has session
keys of other prefork processes,
>> as well as the common ssl session ticket key and ssl cert keys.  In practice the
benefits of prefork are somewhat
>> limited to casual attacks.
> that's clear and anything related to SSL/TLS (certificates, keys)
> needs to be changed, the original question was about user-payload
> like passwords submitted via POST on the neighbour worker

But how do you know it is only the neighbour worker?

If the memory hasn't been cleared, the next connection from the attacker
could get handled by the previous neighbour and confidential data might
still sit in that processes memory readable by the attacker.

What I didn't check until now, is whether one can describe the
places/addresses in memory that are readable by an attacker (any address
or only 64KB around an address at some fixed position in some request or
connection handling struct) and whether we could for some platforms then
describe the real exposure. Some data might always be to far away (very
different address). Not sure whether that's feasible or the answer is
simply "any address".



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