Return-Path: X-Original-To: apmail-httpd-dev-archive@www.apache.org Delivered-To: apmail-httpd-dev-archive@www.apache.org Received: from mail.apache.org (hermes.apache.org [140.211.11.3]) by minotaur.apache.org (Postfix) with SMTP id C08E910A8C for ; Tue, 20 Aug 2013 08:19:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 39803 invoked by uid 500); 20 Aug 2013 08:18:58 -0000 Delivered-To: apmail-httpd-dev-archive@httpd.apache.org Received: (qmail 39262 invoked by uid 500); 20 Aug 2013 08:18:54 -0000 Mailing-List: contact dev-help@httpd.apache.org; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk Reply-To: dev@httpd.apache.org list-help: list-unsubscribe: List-Post: List-Id: Delivered-To: mailing list dev@httpd.apache.org Received: (qmail 39244 invoked by uid 99); 20 Aug 2013 08:18:53 -0000 Received: from athena.apache.org (HELO athena.apache.org) (140.211.11.136) by apache.org (qpsmtpd/0.29) with ESMTP; Tue, 20 Aug 2013 08:18:53 +0000 X-ASF-Spam-Status: No, hits=0.0 required=5.0 tests= X-Spam-Check-By: apache.org Received-SPF: unknown (athena.apache.org: error in processing during lookup of dirkx@webweaving.org) Received: from [204.109.56.33] (HELO ibiza.webweaving.org) (204.109.56.33) by apache.org (qpsmtpd/0.29) with ESMTP; Tue, 20 Aug 2013 08:18:47 +0000 Received: from pikmeer.webweaving.org (pikmeer.webweaving.org [178.18.23.51]) by ibiza.webweaving.org (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id r7K8IPlp000144 for ; Tue, 20 Aug 2013 08:18:26 GMT (envelope-from dirkx@webweaving.org) Received: from [10.11.0.108] (5ED28243.cm-7-3c.dynamic.ziggo.nl [94.210.130.67]) (authenticated bits=0) by pikmeer.webweaving.org (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id r7K8HtGX025930 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO) for ; Tue, 20 Aug 2013 08:18:25 GMT (envelope-from dirkx@webweaving.org) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.5 \(1508\)) Subject: Re: breach attack From: Dirk-Willem van Gulik In-Reply-To: <52069600.6060400@thelounge.net> Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 10:17:55 +0200 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: References: <20130809210422.GA14384@redhat.com> <2250572.368Yd9bN48@k> <52069600.6060400@thelounge.net> To: dev@httpd.apache.org X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1508) X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.7 (ibiza.webweaving.org [204.109.56.32]); Tue, 20 Aug 2013 08:18:26 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: Sender succeeded SMTP AUTH, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.5 (pikmeer.webweaving.org [178.18.23.51]); Tue, 20 Aug 2013 08:18:25 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Checked: Checked by ClamAV on apache.org Op 10 aug. 2013, om 21:35 heeft Reindl Harald = het volgende geschreven: >=20 > IMHO that is all the wrong train >=20 > "victim's browser to visit the targeted website thousands of times" > for me says clearly that a proper server with rate-controls based > on iptable sor a firewall in front of the machine would stop this > and honestly these days i would not connect any production server > without rate-controls to the world wide web >=20 > so i am strictly against mangle in the procotol and risk making > mod_defalte less effective, protections aginst such attacks do > not belong in the application layer A couple of years ago - I would have wholeheartedly agreed with you. However the world is changing. And several things combined make the = assumption that such vigilance is likely (or even possible) no longer a = safe one. At the higher layers - developers work increasingly with abstraction = layers, languages and frameworks which are far removed from HTTP; and = which no longer require the developer to look at things like field = completion, sessions and ajax-dynamic population of fields, gradual = disclosure and what not at the GET level. Instead some (js) library or = framework is used which just does it. So technically it is no longer realistic for the average (or every = crack) programmer to tell you what GETs to normally expect. And = organizationally it is totally unrealistic; there are simply too few = incentives for that information to flow. That 'layer' of the org is not = paid/expected to care. Increasingly the http layer moves to the very bottom of the stack - well = out of sight; tended to by people very far (and commonly at arms length) = removed from the web product. It may even be mostly in some sort of = proxy/pass-through type of mode - where the ops people have no real idea = as to what request goes to what app - and the volume is such that only = automated tools help make sense of it. Wether we like it or not - Apache is now commonly deployed in that = world. So our 'new' users can fairly expect us to tune apache to that sort of = 'blind' and 'bulky' deployments. So I think it somewhat behooves us to = have options to mangle the protocol where and when needed - and focus on = these in 'bulk and blind' modes. Dw.=