Return-Path: Delivered-To: apmail-httpd-dev-archive@www.apache.org Received: (qmail 35531 invoked from network); 13 May 2008 21:19:09 -0000 Received: from hermes.apache.org (HELO mail.apache.org) (140.211.11.2) by minotaur.apache.org with SMTP; 13 May 2008 21:19:09 -0000 Received: (qmail 29267 invoked by uid 500); 13 May 2008 21:19:07 -0000 Delivered-To: apmail-httpd-dev-archive@httpd.apache.org Received: (qmail 29199 invoked by uid 500); 13 May 2008 21:19:07 -0000 Mailing-List: contact dev-help@httpd.apache.org; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk Reply-To: dev@httpd.apache.org list-help: list-unsubscribe: List-Post: List-Id: Delivered-To: mailing list dev@httpd.apache.org Received: (qmail 29188 invoked by uid 99); 13 May 2008 21:19:07 -0000 Received: from nike.apache.org (HELO nike.apache.org) (192.87.106.230) by apache.org (qpsmtpd/0.29) with ESMTP; Tue, 13 May 2008 14:19:07 -0700 X-ASF-Spam-Status: No, hits=-0.0 required=10.0 tests=SPF_PASS X-Spam-Check-By: apache.org Received-SPF: pass (nike.apache.org: domain of chip@force-elite.com designates 72.232.80.58 as permitted sender) Received: from [72.232.80.58] (HELO constant.northnitch.com) (72.232.80.58) by apache.org (qpsmtpd/0.29) with ESMTP; Tue, 13 May 2008 21:18:10 +0000 Received: from Tornado.local (c-67-164-104-143.hsd1.ca.comcast.net [67.164.104.143]) by constant.northnitch.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B2C8A8406 for ; Tue, 13 May 2008 16:18:29 -0500 (CDT) Message-ID: <482A05A5.6050804@force-elite.com> Date: Tue, 13 May 2008 14:18:29 -0700 From: Paul Querna User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.14 (Macintosh/20080421) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: dev@httpd.apache.org Subject: Impact of OpenSSL Randomness issues on Debian Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Checked: Checked by ClamAV on apache.org If you are just catching up: http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2008-0166 http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/05/13/1533212 Most of the talk has been about how SSH Servers and Client private keys are vulnerable. However, Private x509 Keys generated by a vulnerable machine, and used by HTTPS are also guessable. Debian and Ubuntu have made several tools to detect weak key signatures in OpenSSH and OpenVPN. 1) Shouldn't it be possible to write something that detects the weak private key fingerprint from the SSL handshake? 2) Should we remind users on announce@httpd or another medium, that any x509 keys generated on an debian or ubuntu server, such as those used for HTTPS, in the last 2 years, should be re-generated? Thanks, -Paul