Received: by taz.hyperreal.com (8.8.3/V2.0) id PAA17022; Mon, 6 Jan 1997 15:58:53 -0800 (PST) Received: from scanner.worldgate.com by taz.hyperreal.com (8.8.3/V2.0) with ESMTP id PAA17010; Mon, 6 Jan 1997 15:58:48 -0800 (PST) Received: from znep.com (uucp@localhost) by scanner.worldgate.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with UUCP id QAA08672 for new-httpd@hyperreal.com; Mon, 6 Jan 1997 16:58:45 -0700 (MST) Received: from localhost (marcs@localhost) by alive.ampr.ab.ca (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id QAA06105 for ; Mon, 6 Jan 1997 16:58:21 -0700 (MST) Date: Mon, 6 Jan 1997 16:58:21 -0700 (MST) From: Marc Slemko X-Sender: marcs@alive.ampr.ab.ca To: Apache Group Subject: Re: 1.2B4: Stop password field of AuthUserFile at next colon (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: new-httpd-owner@apache.org Precedence: bulk Reply-To: new-httpd@hyperreal.com On Mon, 6 Jan 1997, Rob Hartill wrote: > > I remember Dirk was playing with ":"s recently. > > Where do we stand on people shooting themselves in the foot with /etc/passwd ? I don't see why not. If /etc/passwd will do anything (ie. isn't shadowed), they had better be sure users' passwords can't be cracked by a dictionary based attack so I don't see that using /etc/password will hurt that much. What possible problems are there? I can think of: - bugs in the webserver that let people get the encrypted passwords; sure, but there are a heck of a lot of easier ways on most systems. - passwords passed plaintext across the network; nothing new, on 99% of systems they are anyway. - passwords cached in unsafe browsers; possibly a bit of a problem, but if someone has access to the PC they can sniff them pretty easily. > > .. and do we stand on their foot before or after they shoot it ? :-) > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > Date: Mon, 6 Jan 1997 16:50:19 -0500 (EST) > From: Gregory Neil Shapiro > To: apache-bugs@apache.org > Cc: aej@wpi.edu > Subject: 1.2B4: Stop password field of AuthUserFile at next colon > > Currently, auth_mod.c separates the username and password by the first colon. > However, it sends the rest of the string (after the colon) to crypt for > password comparison. I believe it should use the same code which > auth_mod_dbm.c uses and stop at the next colon. That would allow sites to use > /etc/passwd for the AuthUserFile for system wide functions. Here is a patch > to accomplish this (you'll notice the code is stolen from mod_auth_dbm.c): > > *** src/mod_auth.c~ Tue Dec 24 14:10:29 1996 > --- src/mod_auth.c Mon Jan 6 16:42:09 1997 > *************** > *** 122,131 **** > return NULL; > } > while(!(cfg_getline(l,MAX_STRING_LEN,f))) { > if((l[0] == '#') || (!l[0])) continue; > rpw = l; > w = getword(r->pool, &rpw, ':'); > ! > if(!strcmp(user,w)) { > pfclose(r->pool, f); > return pstrdup (r->pool, rpw); > --- 122,134 ---- > return NULL; > } > while(!(cfg_getline(l,MAX_STRING_LEN,f))) { > + char *colon_pw; > if((l[0] == '#') || (!l[0])) continue; > rpw = l; > w = getword(r->pool, &rpw, ':'); > ! /* Password is up to first : if exists */ > ! colon_pw = strchr(rpw,':'); > ! if (colon_pw) *colon_pw='\0'; > if(!strcmp(user,w)) { > pfclose(r->pool, f); > return pstrdup (r->pool, rpw); >