Return-Path: owner-new-httpd Received: by taz.hyperreal.com (8.6.12/8.6.5) id VAA11590; Fri, 1 Sep 1995 21:01:23 -0700 Received: from sierra.zyzzyva.com by taz.hyperreal.com (8.6.12/8.6.5) with ESMTP id VAA11575; Fri, 1 Sep 1995 21:00:57 -0700 Received: from newshare.newshare.com (root@newshare.newshare.com [204.97.12.47]) by sierra.zyzzyva.com (8.6.12/8.6.11) with ESMTP id WAA05011 for ; Fri, 1 Sep 1995 22:58:51 -0500 Received: (from dave@localhost) by newshare.newshare.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) id XAA17079; Fri, 1 Sep 1995 23:42:09 -0400 Date: Fri, 1 Sep 1995 23:42:09 -0400 From: "David M. Oliver" Subject: Re: secure transfer using skey To: new-httpd@hyperreal.com In-Reply-To: <9509011711.AA01523@ooo.lanl.gov> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-new-httpd@apache.org Precedence: bulk Reply-To: new-httpd@apache.org On Fri, 1 Sep 1995, Rob Hartill wrote: > Basically, skey involves giving challenges which result in a > one-time-password, so if I'm not missing something obvious, clients > and servers can just pass these challenges back a forth inside HTTP > headers, and send the rest of the information encrypted using the > one-time-password. > > the passwords never get transmitted over the net, only the challenges > and encrypted data. This is not quite the way S-Key works from my reading, but "close enough". It seems to me, though, that each user would have to have a relationship with each server, since the SKey "initial passwd" has to be given to the server "off-line" (this is how the server can generate the intermediate phrase, and subsequently know what the client will return "one time"). Thus the user needs, in advance, a "relationship" -- off line -- with each server. Another issue is how a client can generate a sequence of one-time passwords that would be known to a server (since you'd certainly not want to prompt the user to enter the intermediate phrase for every hyperlink). I have been thinking about this, too, from a slightly different perspective, and I find SKey very attractive (if you are willing to force clients to adopt new/additional software). The key, I think, is having a secure way to avoid this previous relationship requirement. We're trying to fit this into our software in such a way that there would need to be only one (prior) relationship, yet access to a "universe" of providers. Our thinking is not beyond the "concept fits" stage, though. > I think the skey code is PD, so could be dropped into clients and > servers. The actual "SKey" is copyright Bellcore but there are several versions extant that appear to be PD. Also, Bellcore is sponsoring a "One Time Password" proposal at IETF. > I must be missing something, cos this is just too simple. Yes, and no. :-) dave +------------------------------------------------------------------+ | David Oliver dave@newshare.com | | Managing Director-Technology Newshare Corporation | +------------------------------------------------------------------+