httpd-cvs mailing list archives

Site index · List index
Message view « Date » · « Thread »
Top « Date » · « Thread »
From wr...@apache.org
Subject svn commit: r1170441 - in /httpd/site/trunk: docs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt xdocs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt
Date Wed, 14 Sep 2011 06:06:53 GMT
Author: wrowe
Date: Wed Sep 14 06:06:53 2011
New Revision: 1170441

URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?rev=1170441&view=rev
Log:
Current draft

Added:
    httpd/site/trunk/docs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt
    httpd/site/trunk/xdocs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt

Added: httpd/site/trunk/docs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt
URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/httpd/site/trunk/docs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt?rev=1170441&view=auto
==============================================================================
--- httpd/site/trunk/docs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt (added)
+++ httpd/site/trunk/docs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt Wed Sep 14 06:06:53 2011
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+          Apache HTTPD Security ADVISORY
+          ==============================
+                UPDATE 3 - FINAL
+
+Title:       Range header DoS vulnerability Apache HTTPD prior to 2.2.20.
+
+CVE:         CVE-2011-3192
+Last Change: 20110831 1800Z
+Date:        20110824 1600Z
+Product:     Apache HTTPD Web Server
+Versions:    Apache 2.0 - all versions prior to 2.2.20 and prior to 2.0.65
+             Apache 1.3 is NOT vulnerable.
+
+Changes since last update
+=========================
+2.2.20 has a fix, 2.2.21 an improved one. Version 1.3 is not vulnerable.
+Further regex/rule improvements.  Explained DoS.  Added wiki link.
+Highlight fact that LimitRequestFieldSize workaround was insufficient.
+
+Changes since update 1
+=========================
+In addition to the 'Range' header - the 'Request-Range' header is equally
+affected. Furthermore various vendor updates, improved regexes (speed and
+accommodating a different and new attack pattern).
+
+Description:
+============
+
+A denial of service vulnerability has been found in the way the multiple
+overlapping ranges are handled by the Apache HTTPD server prior to version
+2.2.20:
+
+     http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Aug/175
+
+An attack tool is circulating in the wild. Active use of this tool has
+been observed.
+
+The attack can be done remotely and with a modest number of requests can
+cause very significant memory and CPU usage on the server.
+
+The default Apache httpd installations version 2.0 prior to 2.0.65 and 
+version 2.2 prior to 2.2.20 are vulnerable.
+
+Apache 2.2.20 does fix this issue; however with a number of side effects
+(see release notes). Version 2.2.21 corrects a protocol defect in 2.2.20,
+and also introduces the MaxRanges directive.
+
+Version 2.0.65 has not been released, but will include this fix, and is
+anticipated in September.
+
+Apache 1.3
+==========
+
+Apache 1.3 is NOT vulnerable. However as explained in the background section
+in more detail - this attack does cause a significant and possibly unexpected
+load. You are advised to review your configuration in that light.
+
+Type of Attack
+==============
+
+This vulnerability concerns a 'Denial of Service' attack. This means that
+a remote attacker, under the right circumstances, is able to slow your
+service or server down to a crawl or exhausting memory available to serve
+requests, leaving it unable to serve legitimate clients in a timely manner.
+
+There are no indications that this leads to a remote exploit; where a
+third party can compromise your security and gain foothold of the server
+itself. The result of this vulnerability is purely one of denying service
+by grinding your server down to a halt and refusing additional connections
+to the server.
+
+Background and the 2007 report
+==============================
+
+There are two aspects to this vulnerability. One is new, is Apache specific;
+and resolved with this server side fix. The other issue is fundamentally a
+protocol design issue dating back to 2007:
+
+      http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2007/Jan/83
+
+The contemporary interpretation of the HTTP protocol (currently) requires a
+server to return multiple (overlapping) ranges; in the order requested. This
+means that one can request a very large range (e.g. from byte 0- to the end)
+100's of times in a single request.
+
+Being able to do so is an issue for (probably all) webservers and currently
+subject of an IETF discussion to change the protocol:
+
+      http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/311
+
+This advisory details a problem with how Apache httpd and its so called
+internal 'bucket brigades' deal with serving such "valid" request. The
+problem is that currently such requests internally explode into 100's of
+large fetches, all of which are kept in memory in an inefficient way. This
+is being addressed in two ways. By making things more efficient. And by
+weeding out or simplifying requests deemed too unwieldy.
+
+FIX
+====
+
+This vulnerability has been fixed in release 2.2.20 and further corrected
+in 2.2.21. You are advised to upgrade to version 2.2.21 (or newer) or the
+legacy 2.0.65 release, once this is published (anticipated in September).
+
+If you cannot upgrade, or cannot wait to upgrade - you can apply the 
+appropriate source code patch and recompile a recent existing version;
+
+  http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/patches/apply_to_2.2.14/ (for 2.2.9 - .14)
+  http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/patches/apply_to_2.2.19/ (for 2.2.15 - .19)
+  http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/patches/apply_to_2.0.64/ (for 2.0.55 - .64)
+
+If you cannot upgrade and/or cannot apply above patches in a timely manner
+then you should consider to apply one or more of the mitigation suggested below.
+
+CAVEATS
+=======
+
+Note that this fix 1) will return a "200 OK" in cases where a 206 respond would
+be larger and 2) changes the behavior of chunked responses. This may affect
+certain clients. See the above background section and IETF reference for
+more detail and the various discussions around fixing this in the protocol.
+
+Furthermore a request with a byterange beyond the end of the file used to
+return 416 but now returns 200. This is a violation of a RFC2616 SHOULD.
+
+Mitigation:
+===========
+
+There are several immediate options to mitigate this issue until a full fix
+is available. Below examples handle both the 'Range' and the legacy
+'Request-Range' with various levels of care.
+
+Note that 'Request-Range' is a legacy name dating back to Netscape Navigator
+2-3 and MSIE 3. Depending on your user community - it is likely that you
+can use option '3' safely for this older 'Request-Range'.
+
+0) Consult http://httpd.apache.org/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt for the most
+   recent information (as this is the final advisory).
+
+1) Use SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite to detect a large number of ranges and then
+   either ignore the Range: header or reject the request.
+
+   Option 1: (Apache 2.2, requires mod_setenvif and mod_headers)
+
+          # Drop the Range header when more than 5 ranges.
+          # CVE-2011-3192
+          SetEnvIf Range (?:,.*?){5,5} bad-range=1
+          RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range
+
+          # We always drop Request-Range; as this is a legacy
+          # dating back to MSIE3 and Netscape 2 and 3.
+          #
+          RequestHeader unset Request-Range
+
+          # optional logging.
+          CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range
+
+   Above may not work for all configurations. In particular situations
+   mod_cache and (language) modules may act before the 'unset'
+   is executed upon during the 'fixup' phase.
+
+   Option 2: (Pre 2.2, requires mod_rewrite and mod_headers)
+
+          # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header.
+          # CVE-2011-3192
+          #
+          RewriteEngine on
+          RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^$) [NC]
+          RewriteRule .* - [F]
+
+          # We always drop Request-Range; as this is a legacy
+          # dating back to MSIE3 and Netscape 2 and 3.
+          #
+          RequestHeader unset Request-Range
+
+   The number 5 is arbitrary. Several 10's should not be an issue and may be
+   required for sites which for example serve PDFs to very high end eReaders
+   or use things such complex http based video streaming.
+
+   WARNING These directives need to be specified in every configured
+   vhost, or inherited from server context as described in:
+   http://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/mod/mod_rewrite.html#vhosts
+
+2) Use mod_headers to completely dis-allow the use of Range headers:
+
+          RequestHeader unset Range
+
+   Note that this may break certain clients - such as those used for
+   e-Readers and progressive/http-streaming video.
+
+   Furthermore to ignore the Netscape Navigator 2-3 and MSIE 3 specific
+   legacy header - add:
+
+          RequestHeader unset Request-Range
+
+   Unlike the commonly used 'Range' header - dropping the 'Request-Range'
+   is not likely to affect many clients.
+
+4) Deploy a Range header count module as a temporary stopgap measure.
+
+   A stop-gap module which is runtime-configurable can be found at:
+
+     http://people.apache.org/~fuankg/httpd/mod_rangecnt-improved/
+ 
+   A simpler stop-gap module which requires compile-time configuration 
+   is also available:
+
+     http://people.apache.org/~dirkx/mod_rangecnt.c
+
+Note
+====
+
+Earlier advisories suggested the use of LimitRequestFieldSize. This mitigation
+was not fully effective and can by bypassed by splitting the attack vector up
+across multiple headers. Therefore you should not rely on LimitRequestFieldSize
+alone.
+
+OS and Vendor specific information
+==================================
+
+Red Hat:        Has additional RHEL specific information at:
+                https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=732928
+
+NetWare:        Pre compiled binaries are available;
+                runtime-configurable:
+                http://people.apache.org/~fuankg/httpd/mod_rangecnt-improved/
+                compile-time configured for 5 ranges:
+                http://people.apache.org/~fuankg/httpd/mod_rangecnt/
+
+Win32:          Pre compiled binaries are available;
+                runtime-configurable:
+                http://people.apache.org/~gsmith/httpd/binaries/modules/mod_rangecnt-improved/
+                compile-time configured for 5 ranges:
+                http://people.apache.org/~gsmith/httpd/binaries/modules/mod_rangecnt/
+
+mod_security:   Has updated their rule set; see
+                http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/08/mitigation-of-apache-range-header-dos-attack.html
+
+
+Actions:
+========
+
+Apache HTTPD users who are concerned about a DoS attack against their server
+should 1) upgrade to version 2.2.21 (or 2.0.65 when it becomes available),
+2) if not possible - apply the provided patches or 3) consider implementing
+any of the above mitigation immediately.
+
+When using a third party attack tool to verify vulnerability - note that most
+of the versions in the wild currently check for the presence of mod_deflate;
+and will (mis)report that your server is not vulnerable if this module is not
+present. This vulnerability is not dependent on presence or absence of
+that module.
+
+Planning:
+=========
+
+No further advisory email announcements are planned. However we will track
+minor refinements of this advisory at;
+
+  http://httpd.apache.org/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt
+
+Further recommendations and discussion on workarounds, or user-agent
+specific complications of these fixes will be tracked at;
+
+  http://wiki.apache.org/httpd/CVE-2011-3192
+

Added: httpd/site/trunk/xdocs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt
URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/httpd/site/trunk/xdocs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt?rev=1170441&view=auto
==============================================================================
--- httpd/site/trunk/xdocs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt (added)
+++ httpd/site/trunk/xdocs/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt Wed Sep 14 06:06:53 2011
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+          Apache HTTPD Security ADVISORY
+          ==============================
+                UPDATE 3 - FINAL
+
+Title:       Range header DoS vulnerability Apache HTTPD prior to 2.2.20.
+
+CVE:         CVE-2011-3192
+Last Change: 20110831 1800Z
+Date:        20110824 1600Z
+Product:     Apache HTTPD Web Server
+Versions:    Apache 2.0 - all versions prior to 2.2.20 and prior to 2.0.65
+             Apache 1.3 is NOT vulnerable.
+
+Changes since last update
+=========================
+2.2.20 has a fix, 2.2.21 an improved one. Version 1.3 is not vulnerable.
+Further regex/rule improvements.  Explained DoS.  Added wiki link.
+Highlight fact that LimitRequestFieldSize workaround was insufficient.
+
+Changes since update 1
+=========================
+In addition to the 'Range' header - the 'Request-Range' header is equally
+affected. Furthermore various vendor updates, improved regexes (speed and
+accommodating a different and new attack pattern).
+
+Description:
+============
+
+A denial of service vulnerability has been found in the way the multiple
+overlapping ranges are handled by the Apache HTTPD server prior to version
+2.2.20:
+
+     http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Aug/175
+
+An attack tool is circulating in the wild. Active use of this tool has
+been observed.
+
+The attack can be done remotely and with a modest number of requests can
+cause very significant memory and CPU usage on the server.
+
+The default Apache httpd installations version 2.0 prior to 2.0.65 and 
+version 2.2 prior to 2.2.20 are vulnerable.
+
+Apache 2.2.20 does fix this issue; however with a number of side effects
+(see release notes). Version 2.2.21 corrects a protocol defect in 2.2.20,
+and also introduces the MaxRanges directive.
+
+Version 2.0.65 has not been released, but will include this fix, and is
+anticipated in September.
+
+Apache 1.3
+==========
+
+Apache 1.3 is NOT vulnerable. However as explained in the background section
+in more detail - this attack does cause a significant and possibly unexpected
+load. You are advised to review your configuration in that light.
+
+Type of Attack
+==============
+
+This vulnerability concerns a 'Denial of Service' attack. This means that
+a remote attacker, under the right circumstances, is able to slow your
+service or server down to a crawl or exhausting memory available to serve
+requests, leaving it unable to serve legitimate clients in a timely manner.
+
+There are no indications that this leads to a remote exploit; where a
+third party can compromise your security and gain foothold of the server
+itself. The result of this vulnerability is purely one of denying service
+by grinding your server down to a halt and refusing additional connections
+to the server.
+
+Background and the 2007 report
+==============================
+
+There are two aspects to this vulnerability. One is new, is Apache specific;
+and resolved with this server side fix. The other issue is fundamentally a
+protocol design issue dating back to 2007:
+
+      http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2007/Jan/83
+
+The contemporary interpretation of the HTTP protocol (currently) requires a
+server to return multiple (overlapping) ranges; in the order requested. This
+means that one can request a very large range (e.g. from byte 0- to the end)
+100's of times in a single request.
+
+Being able to do so is an issue for (probably all) webservers and currently
+subject of an IETF discussion to change the protocol:
+
+      http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/311
+
+This advisory details a problem with how Apache httpd and its so called
+internal 'bucket brigades' deal with serving such "valid" request. The
+problem is that currently such requests internally explode into 100's of
+large fetches, all of which are kept in memory in an inefficient way. This
+is being addressed in two ways. By making things more efficient. And by
+weeding out or simplifying requests deemed too unwieldy.
+
+FIX
+====
+
+This vulnerability has been fixed in release 2.2.20 and further corrected
+in 2.2.21. You are advised to upgrade to version 2.2.21 (or newer) or the
+legacy 2.0.65 release, once this is published (anticipated in September).
+
+If you cannot upgrade, or cannot wait to upgrade - you can apply the 
+appropriate source code patch and recompile a recent existing version;
+
+  http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/patches/apply_to_2.2.14/ (for 2.2.9 - .14)
+  http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/patches/apply_to_2.2.19/ (for 2.2.15 - .19)
+  http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/patches/apply_to_2.0.64/ (for 2.0.55 - .64)
+
+If you cannot upgrade and/or cannot apply above patches in a timely manner
+then you should consider to apply one or more of the mitigation suggested below.
+
+CAVEATS
+=======
+
+Note that this fix 1) will return a "200 OK" in cases where a 206 respond would
+be larger and 2) changes the behavior of chunked responses. This may affect
+certain clients. See the above background section and IETF reference for
+more detail and the various discussions around fixing this in the protocol.
+
+Furthermore a request with a byterange beyond the end of the file used to
+return 416 but now returns 200. This is a violation of a RFC2616 SHOULD.
+
+Mitigation:
+===========
+
+There are several immediate options to mitigate this issue until a full fix
+is available. Below examples handle both the 'Range' and the legacy
+'Request-Range' with various levels of care.
+
+Note that 'Request-Range' is a legacy name dating back to Netscape Navigator
+2-3 and MSIE 3. Depending on your user community - it is likely that you
+can use option '3' safely for this older 'Request-Range'.
+
+0) Consult http://httpd.apache.org/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt for the most
+   recent information (as this is the final advisory).
+
+1) Use SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite to detect a large number of ranges and then
+   either ignore the Range: header or reject the request.
+
+   Option 1: (Apache 2.2, requires mod_setenvif and mod_headers)
+
+          # Drop the Range header when more than 5 ranges.
+          # CVE-2011-3192
+          SetEnvIf Range (?:,.*?){5,5} bad-range=1
+          RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range
+
+          # We always drop Request-Range; as this is a legacy
+          # dating back to MSIE3 and Netscape 2 and 3.
+          #
+          RequestHeader unset Request-Range
+
+          # optional logging.
+          CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range
+
+   Above may not work for all configurations. In particular situations
+   mod_cache and (language) modules may act before the 'unset'
+   is executed upon during the 'fixup' phase.
+
+   Option 2: (Pre 2.2, requires mod_rewrite and mod_headers)
+
+          # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header.
+          # CVE-2011-3192
+          #
+          RewriteEngine on
+          RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^$) [NC]
+          RewriteRule .* - [F]
+
+          # We always drop Request-Range; as this is a legacy
+          # dating back to MSIE3 and Netscape 2 and 3.
+          #
+          RequestHeader unset Request-Range
+
+   The number 5 is arbitrary. Several 10's should not be an issue and may be
+   required for sites which for example serve PDFs to very high end eReaders
+   or use things such complex http based video streaming.
+
+   WARNING These directives need to be specified in every configured
+   vhost, or inherited from server context as described in:
+   http://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/mod/mod_rewrite.html#vhosts
+
+2) Use mod_headers to completely dis-allow the use of Range headers:
+
+          RequestHeader unset Range
+
+   Note that this may break certain clients - such as those used for
+   e-Readers and progressive/http-streaming video.
+
+   Furthermore to ignore the Netscape Navigator 2-3 and MSIE 3 specific
+   legacy header - add:
+
+          RequestHeader unset Request-Range
+
+   Unlike the commonly used 'Range' header - dropping the 'Request-Range'
+   is not likely to affect many clients.
+
+4) Deploy a Range header count module as a temporary stopgap measure.
+
+   A stop-gap module which is runtime-configurable can be found at:
+
+     http://people.apache.org/~fuankg/httpd/mod_rangecnt-improved/
+ 
+   A simpler stop-gap module which requires compile-time configuration 
+   is also available:
+
+     http://people.apache.org/~dirkx/mod_rangecnt.c
+
+Note
+====
+
+Earlier advisories suggested the use of LimitRequestFieldSize. This mitigation
+was not fully effective and can by bypassed by splitting the attack vector up
+across multiple headers. Therefore you should not rely on LimitRequestFieldSize
+alone.
+
+OS and Vendor specific information
+==================================
+
+Red Hat:        Has additional RHEL specific information at:
+                https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=732928
+
+NetWare:        Pre compiled binaries are available;
+                runtime-configurable:
+                http://people.apache.org/~fuankg/httpd/mod_rangecnt-improved/
+                compile-time configured for 5 ranges:
+                http://people.apache.org/~fuankg/httpd/mod_rangecnt/
+
+Win32:          Pre compiled binaries are available;
+                runtime-configurable:
+                http://people.apache.org/~gsmith/httpd/binaries/modules/mod_rangecnt-improved/
+                compile-time configured for 5 ranges:
+                http://people.apache.org/~gsmith/httpd/binaries/modules/mod_rangecnt/
+
+mod_security:   Has updated their rule set; see
+                http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/08/mitigation-of-apache-range-header-dos-attack.html
+
+
+Actions:
+========
+
+Apache HTTPD users who are concerned about a DoS attack against their server
+should 1) upgrade to version 2.2.21 (or 2.0.65 when it becomes available),
+2) if not possible - apply the provided patches or 3) consider implementing
+any of the above mitigation immediately.
+
+When using a third party attack tool to verify vulnerability - note that most
+of the versions in the wild currently check for the presence of mod_deflate;
+and will (mis)report that your server is not vulnerable if this module is not
+present. This vulnerability is not dependent on presence or absence of
+that module.
+
+Planning:
+=========
+
+No further advisory email announcements are planned. However we will track
+minor refinements of this advisory at;
+
+  http://httpd.apache.org/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt
+
+Further recommendations and discussion on workarounds, or user-agent
+specific complications of these fixes will be tracked at;
+
+  http://wiki.apache.org/httpd/CVE-2011-3192
+



Mime
View raw message