Apache は HTTP/1.1 の規格に記述されているコンテントネゴシエーションを Modified: httpd/httpd/trunk/docs/manual/misc/security_tips.html.en URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/httpd/httpd/trunk/docs/manual/misc/security_tips.html.en?rev=686855&r1=686854&r2=686855&view=diff ============================================================================== --- httpd/httpd/trunk/docs/manual/misc/security_tips.html.en (original) +++ httpd/httpd/trunk/docs/manual/misc/security_tips.html.en Mon Aug 18 12:22:54 2008 @@ -19,10 +19,11 @@ Apache > HTTP Server > Documentation > Version 2.3 > Miscellaneous Documentation

Security Tips

Available Languages: en | - ko

+ ko | + tr

Some hints and tips on security issues in setting up a web server. +

Some hints and tips on security issues in setting up a web server. Some of the suggestions will be general, others specific to Apache.

Keep up to Date
The values of various timeout-related directives provided by other modules should be checked.
The directives +
The directives LimitRequestBody, LimitRequestFields, LimitRequestFieldSize, @@ -119,36 +120,36 @@
The use of a threaded mpm may allow you to handle more simultaneous connections, thereby - mitigating DoS attacks. Further, the experimental + mitigating DoS attacks. Further, the experimental event mpm uses asynchronous processing to avoid devoting a thread to each connection. At the current point of time this is work in progress and not fully implemented. Especially the - event mpm is currently incompatible with + event mpm is currently incompatible with mod_ssl and other input filters.
There are a number of third-party modules available through http://modules.apache.org/ that can restrict certain client behaviors and thereby mitigate DoS problems.

Permissions on ServerRoot Directories

- - - -

In typical operation, Apache is started by the root user, and it - switches to the user defined by the User directive to serve hits. As is the - case with any command that root executes, you must take care that it is - protected from modification by non-root users. Not only must the files - themselves be writeable only by root, but so must the directories, and - parents of all directories. For example, if you choose to place - ServerRoot in /usr/local/apache then it is suggested that you create - that directory as root, with commands like these:

+ + +

In typical operation, Apache is started by the root user, and it + switches to the user defined by the User directive to serve hits. As is the + case with any command that root executes, you must take care that it is + protected from modification by non-root users. Not only must the files + themselves be writeable only by root, but so must the directories, and + parents of all directories. For example, if you choose to place + ServerRoot in /usr/local/apache then it is suggested that + you create that directory as root, with commands like these:

mkdir /usr/local/apache cd /usr/local/apache @@ -157,193 +158,195 @@ chgrp 0 . bin conf logs chmod 755 . bin conf logs

- -

It is assumed that /, /usr, and /usr/local are only modifiable by - root. When you install the httpd executable, you - should ensure that it is similarly protected:

- + +

It is assumed that /, /usr, and + /usr/local are only modifiable by root. When you install the + httpd executable, you should ensure that it is + similarly protected:

cp httpd /usr/local/apache/bin chown 0 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd chgrp 0 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd chmod 511 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd

- -

You can create an htdocs subdirectory which is modifiable by other - users -- since root never executes any files out of there, and shouldn't + +

You can create an htdocs subdirectory which is modifiable by other + users -- since root never executes any files out of there, and shouldn't be creating files in there.

- -

If you allow non-root users to modify any files that root either - executes or writes on then you open your system to root compromises. + +

If you allow non-root users to modify any files that root either + executes or writes on then you open your system to root compromises. For example, someone could replace the httpd binary so that the next time you start it, it will execute some arbitrary code. If the logs directory is writeable (by a non-root user), someone could replace - a log file with a symlink to some other system file, and then root - might overwrite that file with arbitrary data. If the log files - themselves are writeable (by a non-root user), then someone may be + a log file with a symlink to some other system file, and then root + might overwrite that file with arbitrary data. If the log files + themselves are writeable (by a non-root user), then someone may be able to overwrite the log itself with bogus data.

- +

Server Side Includes

- - + -

Server Side Includes (SSI) present a server administrator with + +

Server Side Includes (SSI) present a server administrator with several potential security risks.

- -

The first risk is the increased load on the server. All - SSI-enabled files have to be parsed by Apache, whether or not - there are any SSI directives included within the files. While this - load increase is minor, in a shared server environment it can become + +

The first risk is the increased load on the server. All + SSI-enabled files have to be parsed by Apache, whether or not + there are any SSI directives included within the files. While this + load increase is minor, in a shared server environment it can become significant.

- -

SSI files also pose the same risks that are associated with CGI - scripts in general. Using the "exec cmd" element, SSI-enabled files - can execute any CGI script or program under the permissions of the - user and group Apache runs as, as configured in httpd.conf.

- -

There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files while still + +

SSI files also pose the same risks that are associated with CGI + scripts in general. Using the exec cmd element, SSI-enabled + files can execute any CGI script or program under the permissions of the + user and group Apache runs as, as configured in + httpd.conf.

+ +

There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files while still taking advantage of the benefits they provide.

- -

To isolate the damage a wayward SSI file can cause, a server - administrator can enable suexec as + +

To isolate the damage a wayward SSI file can cause, a server + administrator can enable suexec as described in the CGI in General section.

- -

Enabling SSI for files with .html or .htm extensions can be - dangerous. This is especially true in a shared, or high traffic, - server environment. SSI-enabled files should have a separate extension, - such as the conventional .shtml. This helps keep server load at a - minimum and allows for easier management of risk.

- -

Another solution is to disable the ability to run scripts and + +

Enabling SSI for files with .html or .htm + extensions can be dangerous. This is especially true in a shared, or high + traffic, server environment. SSI-enabled files should have a separate + extension, such as the conventional .shtml. This helps keep + server load at a minimum and allows for easier management of risk.

+ +

Another solution is to disable the ability to run scripts and programs from SSI pages. To do this replace Includes - with IncludesNOEXEC in the Options directive. Note that users may - still use <--#include virtual="..." --> to execute CGI scripts if - these scripts are in directories designated by a ScriptAlias directive.

- + with IncludesNOEXEC in the Options directive. Note that users may + still use <--#include virtual="..." --> to execute CGI + scripts if these scripts are in directories designated by a ScriptAlias directive.

CGI in General

- - + -

First of all, you always have to remember that you must trust the - writers of the CGI scripts/programs or your ability to spot potential - security holes in CGI, whether they were deliberate or accidental. CGI - scripts can run essentially arbitrary commands on your system with the - permissions of the web server user and can therefore be extremely + +

First of all, you always have to remember that you must trust the + writers of the CGI scripts/programs or your ability to spot potential + security holes in CGI, whether they were deliberate or accidental. CGI + scripts can run essentially arbitrary commands on your system with the + permissions of the web server user and can therefore be extremely dangerous if they are not carefully checked.

- -

All the CGI scripts will run as the same user, so they have potential - to conflict (accidentally or deliberately) with other scripts e.g. User - A hates User B, so he writes a script to trash User B's CGI database. One + +

All the CGI scripts will run as the same user, so they have potential + to conflict (accidentally or deliberately) with other scripts e.g. User + A hates User B, so he writes a script to trash User B's CGI database. One program which can be used to allow scripts to run as different users is - suEXEC which is included with Apache as of - 1.2 and is called from special hooks in the Apache server code. Another - popular way of doing this is with + suEXEC which is included with Apache as of + 1.2 and is called from special hooks in the Apache server code. Another + popular way of doing this is with CGIWrap.

- +

Non Script Aliased CGI

- - + -

Allowing users to execute CGI scripts in any directory should only be + +

Allowing users to execute CGI scripts in any directory should only be considered if:

- +

You trust your users not to write scripts which will deliberately +
You trust your users not to write scripts which will deliberately or accidentally expose your system to an attack.
You consider security at your site to be so feeble in other areas, +
You consider security at your site to be so feeble in other areas, as to make one more potential hole irrelevant.
You have no users, and nobody ever visits your server.

- +

Script Aliased CGI

- - + -

Limiting CGI to special directories gives the admin control over what - goes into those directories. This is inevitably more secure than non - script aliased CGI, but only if users with write access to the - directories are trusted or the admin is willing to test each + +

Limiting CGI to special directories gives the admin control over what + goes into those directories. This is inevitably more secure than non + script aliased CGI, but only if users with write access to the + directories are trusted or the admin is willing to test each new CGI script/program for potential security holes.

- -

Most sites choose this option over the non script aliased CGI + +

Most sites choose this option over the non script aliased CGI approach.

- +

Protecting System Settings

- - + -

To run a really tight ship, you'll want to stop users from setting - up .htaccess files which can override security features + +

To run a really tight ship, you'll want to stop users from setting + up .htaccess files which can override security features you've configured. Here's one way to do it.

- +

In the server configuration file, put

- +

<Directory /> AllowOverride None </Directory>

- -

This prevents the use of .htaccess files in all + +

This prevents the use of .htaccess files in all directories apart from those specifically enabled.

- +

Protect Server Files by Default

- - + -

One aspect of Apache which is occasionally misunderstood is the - feature of default access. That is, unless you take steps to change it, - if the server can find its way to a file through normal URL mapping + +

One aspect of Apache which is occasionally misunderstood is the + feature of default access. That is, unless you take steps to change it, + if the server can find its way to a file through normal URL mapping rules, it can serve it to clients.

- +

For instance, consider the following example:

- +

# cd /; ln -s / public_html Accessing http://localhost/~root/

- -

This would allow clients to walk through the entire filesystem. To - work around this, add the following block to your server's + +

This would allow clients to walk through the entire filesystem. To + work around this, add the following block to your server's configuration:

- +

<Directory /> Order Deny,Allow Deny from all </Directory>

- -

This will forbid default access to filesystem locations. Add - appropriate Directory blocks to + +

This will forbid default access to filesystem locations. Add + appropriate Directory blocks to allow access only in those areas you wish. For example,

- +

<Directory /usr/users/*/public_html> Order Deny,Allow @@ -354,73 +357,74 @@ Allow from all </Directory>

- -

Pay particular attention to the interactions of Location and Directory directives; for instance, even + +

Pay particular attention to the interactions of Location and Directory directives; for instance, even if <Directory /> denies access, a <Location /> directive might overturn it.

- -

Also be wary of playing games with the UserDir directive; setting it to - something like "./" would have the same effect, for root, as the first - example above. If you are using Apache 1.3 or above, we strongly - recommend that you include the following line in your server + +

Also be wary of playing games with the UserDir directive; setting it to + something like ./ would have the same effect, for root, as + the first example above. If you are using Apache 1.3 or above, we strongly + recommend that you include the following line in your server configuration files:

- +

UserDir disabled root

- +

Watching Your Logs

- - + -

To keep up-to-date with what is actually going on against your server - you have to check the Log Files. Even though - the log files only reports what has already happened, they will give you - some understanding of what attacks is thrown against the server and + +

To keep up-to-date with what is actually going on against your server + you have to check the Log Files. Even though + the log files only reports what has already happened, they will give you + some understanding of what attacks is thrown against the server and allow you to check if the necessary level of security is present.

- +

A couple of examples:

- +

grep -c "/jsp/source.jsp?/jsp/ /jsp/source.jsp??" access_log grep "client denied" error_log | tail -n 10

- +

The first example will list the number of attacks trying to exploit the - Apache Tomcat - Source.JSP Malformed Request Information Disclosure Vulnerability, + Apache Tomcat + Source.JSP Malformed Request Information Disclosure Vulnerability, the second example will list the ten last denied clients, for example:

- +

- [Thu Jul 11 17:18:39 2002] [error] [client foo.example.com] client denied + [Thu Jul 11 17:18:39 2002] [error] [client foo.example.com] client denied by server configuration: /usr/local/apache/htdocs/.htpasswd

- -

As you can see, the log files only report what already has happened, so - if the client had been able to access the .htpasswd file you + +

As you can see, the log files only report what already has happened, so + if the client had been able to access the .htpasswd file you would have seen something similar to:

- +

foo.example.com - - [12/Jul/2002:01:59:13 +0200] "GET /.htpasswd HTTP/1.1"

- -

in your Access Log. This means - you probably commented out the following in your server configuration + +

in your Access Log. This means + you probably commented out the following in your server configuration file:

- +

<Files ~ "^\.ht"> Order allow,deny Deny from all </Files>

- +

Description:	Network timeout for proxied requests
Syntax:	`ProxyTimeout seconds`
Default:	`ProxyTimeout 300`
Default:	`Value of Timeout`
Context:	server config, virtual host
Status:	Extension
Module:	mod_proxy

Security Tips

Permissions on ServerRoot Directories

Server Side Includes

CGI in General

Non Script Aliased CGI

Script Aliased CGI

Other sources of dynamic content

Protecting System Settings

Protect Server Files by Default

Watching Your Logs

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