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From "Andrew Purtell (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (HBASE-9578) Client side cell encryption
Date Fri, 04 Oct 2013 15:35:52 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-9578?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13786256#comment-13786256

Andrew Purtell commented on HBASE-9578:

bq. I sort of feel like client machines are probably more easily compromised than server -

The difference is as far as leaking secrets a client compromise affects one user or application,
while a server compromise can affect them all. 

bq. So, you see REST clients as having to do the encryption however is appropriate for each
particular client.

Yes, but more like I see REST as really suitable for layering - do the basic data access protocol
in something like Stargate, and then do caching, access control, and data security on top
with specialist components. For a RESTful stack that's the way to go. 

Also, there is the OP on this JIRA and then that rather long winded follow up comment. If
pursuing the bulk of the latter, then there would be a fair amount of tooling needed that
could be used for doing something for REST and Thrift clients as well as the Java API. 

> Client side cell encryption
> ---------------------------
>                 Key: HBASE-9578
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-9578
>             Project: HBase
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>            Reporter: Andrew Purtell
> HBASE-7544 will protect key and value data on the server from accidental leakage by way
of improperly disposed disks, improper direct filesystem access, or incorrect HDFS permissions.
There are also use cases where sensitive data stored in a table or column family by a given
user or application should be protected from all others, and the combination of transparent
server-side storage encryption and transport security (SASL auth-conf) is still not sufficient.
These instances call for a client side per-cell encryption feature, given the following additional
> - The scope of transmission, distribution, and storage of private key material should
be as limited as possible. The server is a centralized target (even in the case of an HBase
cluster) where the scope of damage from a compromise is magnified if user key material also
resides there or can be intercepted after compromise. Where keys are stored in hardware devices,
e.g. smartcards, getting the keys to the server may be not possible anyway.
> - A client system is far more likely than a contended shared server resource to have
necessary available CPU cycles for per-operation cryptographic overheads.
> For some cases we might not care so much about the second item, but the first is very
> I have an implementation of per cell client side encryption as an encrypting HTable wrapper
which I could contribute if there is interest.
> This JIRA is also about brainstorming how to do better than that.

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