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From "Larry McCay (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (HBASE-9578) Client side cell encryption
Date Fri, 04 Oct 2013 14:09:42 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-9578?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13786168#comment-13786168

Larry McCay commented on HBASE-9578:

I see. Well, I mostly wanted to see what your sense was for REST clients.
So, you see REST clients as having to do the encryption however is appropriate for each particular
I assume that the HTable wrapper that you talk about is a client side thing available to client
application development - correct?

We could potentially build something into the Knox DSL for REST client access to HBase - if
this were to be a desirable feature for REST - but of course that is but one potential REST

Just trying to make sure we have REST on par with CLI.

> Client side cell encryption
> ---------------------------
>                 Key: HBASE-9578
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-9578
>             Project: HBase
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>            Reporter: Andrew Purtell
> HBASE-7544 will protect key and value data on the server from accidental leakage by way
of improperly disposed disks, improper direct filesystem access, or incorrect HDFS permissions.
There are also use cases where sensitive data stored in a table or column family by a given
user or application should be protected from all others, and the combination of transparent
server-side storage encryption and transport security (SASL auth-conf) is still not sufficient.
These instances call for a client side per-cell encryption feature, given the following additional
> - The scope of transmission, distribution, and storage of private key material should
be as limited as possible. The server is a centralized target (even in the case of an HBase
cluster) where the scope of damage from a compromise is magnified if user key material also
resides there or can be intercepted after compromise. Where keys are stored in hardware devices,
e.g. smartcards, getting the keys to the server may be not possible anyway.
> - A client system is far more likely than a contended shared server resource to have
necessary available CPU cycles for per-operation cryptographic overheads.
> For some cases we might not care so much about the second item, but the first is very
> I have an implementation of per cell client side encryption as an encrypting HTable wrapper
which I could contribute if there is interest.
> This JIRA is also about brainstorming how to do better than that.

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