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From "Andrew Purtell (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (HBASE-7544) Transparent table/CF encryption
Date Fri, 15 Mar 2013 17:56:14 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-7544?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13603596#comment-13603596
] 

Andrew Purtell commented on HBASE-7544:
---------------------------------------

bq. w.r.t. the compilation error

A 'mvn -Dcrypto -Dhadoop.profile=2.0 -DskipTests clean install' to get everything in place
in the local Maven cache followed by a 'mvn -Dcrypto -Dhadoop.profile=2.0 test -Dtest=TestHFileEncryption'
works for me here. 

(I am using a locally patched version of Hadoop branch-2 with crypto support. You can get
it at https://github.com/intel-hadoop/hadoop-common-rhino/tree/branch-2. Be sure to compile
Hadoop with -Pnative and include the directory holding the newly built libhadoop.so in LD_LIBRARY_PATH
or TestHFileEncryption won't pass.)

bq. In hbase-common/pom.xml

Yes that should be -Dcrypto. The 'crypto' or 'nocrypto' profiles are activated depending on
if that is defined or not. If you have some thoughts on how this could be done better with
Maven that would be great. Unfortunately a separate module isn't feasible because of the changes
in hbase-server. Originally I didn't do any of this Maven hacking, I just used reflection
in Encryption.java, but I don't want to do it that way because reflection is brittle and slow.
I also need to use a different constructor for the WALReader in SequenceFileLogReader. (This
is because HBase uses the deprecated Hadoop 1 style constructors for SequenceFile and the
crypto support for SequenceFile, when using those constructors, requires a crypto context
at instantiation.) So at a minimum I had to separate out a crypto enabled SequenceFileLogReader
from a stock SequenceFileLogReader. This difference would be an excellent candidate for a
hadoop-compat module as soon as there's a Hadoop version suitable for targeting.
                
> Transparent table/CF encryption
> -------------------------------
>
>                 Key: HBASE-7544
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-7544
>             Project: HBase
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>          Components: HFile, io
>    Affects Versions: 0.96.0
>            Reporter: Andrew Purtell
>            Assignee: Andrew Purtell
>         Attachments: 7544.patch, 7544.patch, 7544.pdf
>
>
> Introduce transparent encryption of HBase on disk data.
> Depends on a separate contribution of an encryption codec framework to Hadoop core and
an AES-NI (native code) codec. This is work done in the context of MAPREDUCE-4491 but I'd
gather there will be additional JIRAs for common and HDFS parts of it.
> Requirements:
> - Transparent encryption at the CF or table level
> - Protect against all data leakage from files at rest
> - Two-tier key architecture for consistency with best practices for this feature in the
RDBMS world
> - Built-in key management
> - Flexible and non-intrusive key rotation
> - Mechanisms not exposed to or modifiable by users
> - Hardware security module integration (via Java KeyStore)
> - HBCK support for transparently encrypted files (+ plugin architecture for HBCK)
> Additional goals:
> - Shell support for administrative functions
> - Avoid performance impact for the null crypto codec case
> - Play nicely with other changes underway: in HFile, block coding, etc.
> We're aiming for rough parity with Oracle's transparent tablespace encryption feature,
described in http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/owp-security-advanced-security-11gr-133411.pdf
as
> {quote}
> “Transparent Data Encryption uses a 2-tier key architecture for flexible and non-intrusive
key rotation and least operational and performance impact: Each application table with at
least one encrypted column has its own table key, which is applied to all encrypted columns
in that table. Equally, each encrypted tablespace has its own tablespace key. Table keys are
stored in the data dictionary of the database, while tablespace keys are stored in the header
of the tablespace and additionally, the header of each underlying OS file that makes up the
tablespace.  Each of these keys is encrypted with the TDE master encryption key, which is
stored outside of the database in an external security module: either the Oracle Wallet (a
PKCS#12 formatted file that is encrypted using a passphrase supplied either by the designated
security administrator or DBA during setup),  or a Hardware Security Module (HSM) device for
higher assurance […]”
> {quote}
> Further design details forthcoming in a design document and patch as soon as we have
all of the clearances in place.

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