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From "Eric Badger (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (YARN-7516) Security check for untrusted docker image
Date Thu, 11 Jan 2018 19:17:00 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-7516?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16322785#comment-16322785
] 

Eric Badger commented on YARN-7516:
-----------------------------------

bq. The untrusted image will appear as privileged but all kernel privileges dropped and disconnected
all devices to outside world. Therefore, it isn't really privileged, only appear as root in
the docker container without real root privileges to outside world.
I don't believe it disconnects all devices. According to the Docker documentation, running
as privileged automatically gives it access to *all* devices. Removing --device in the case
of a privileged container (as is done in this patch) is moot, since the point of --device
is to give containers access to devices that they would normally only be able to access if
they were privileged. 

https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#runtime-privilege-and-linux-capabilities

bq. If you are suggesting to disallow --privileged flag for untrusted image completely, then
it will limit our ability to try out new images before verifying the untrusted image can be
promoted to privileged registry. Does this help to explain the reason that we don't check
registry is privileged in set_privileged flag?
I still don't quite understand why you require a container to be privileged to try new images.

> Security check for untrusted docker image
> -----------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: YARN-7516
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-7516
>             Project: Hadoop YARN
>          Issue Type: Sub-task
>            Reporter: Eric Yang
>            Assignee: Eric Yang
>         Attachments: YARN-7516.001.patch, YARN-7516.002.patch, YARN-7516.003.patch, YARN-7516.004.patch,
YARN-7516.005.patch, YARN-7516.006.patch, YARN-7516.007.patch
>
>
> Hadoop YARN Services can support using private docker registry image or docker image
from docker hub.  In current implementation, Hadoop security is enforced through username
and group membership, and enforce uid:gid consistency in docker container and distributed
file system.  There is cloud use case for having ability to run untrusted docker image on
the same cluster for testing.  
> The basic requirement for untrusted container is to ensure all kernel and root privileges
are dropped, and there is no interaction with distributed file system to avoid contamination.
 We can probably enforce detection of untrusted docker image by checking the following:
> # If docker image is from public docker hub repository, the container is automatically
flagged as insecure, and disk volume mount are disabled automatically, and drop all kernel
capabilities.
> # If docker image is from private repository in docker hub, and there is a white list
to allow the private repository, disk volume mount is allowed, kernel capabilities follows
the allowed list.
> # If docker image is from private trusted registry with image name like "private.registry.local:5000/centos",
and white list allows this private trusted repository.  Disk volume mount is allowed, kernel
capabilities follows the allowed list.



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