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From "Eric Yang (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (YARN-7516) Security check for untrusted docker image
Date Wed, 03 Jan 2018 23:14:00 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-7516?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16310455#comment-16310455
] 

Eric Yang commented on YARN-7516:
---------------------------------

[~ebadger] The same question has been ask by Vinod on Dec 11.  It might be technically correct
to have {{yarn.nodemanager.runtime.linux.docker.trusted-registry}}, but it is difficult to
find.  My thinking was a bigger plan for {{yarn.docker.}} namespace for end user friendly
configuration.  I am open to reuse {{DOCKER_CONTAINER_RUNTIME_PREFIX}}, if majority of people
prefer this.

I am not in favor of shifting all validation logic towards container-executor.cfg.  Java is
still better than c in prevention of buffer overflow.  There is no guarantee that we don't
introduce buffer overflow bugs in root user validation.  They can lead to new potential for
spear phishing attack.  As the history has shown (YARN-7590), container-executor is not as
harden as we thought.  If YARN user is compromised, then it can rewrite any file as any other
user on hdfs.  We will have more coverage to setup defensive mechanism in YARN code logic
to extend our security perimeter rather than focus solely on root user defensive mechanism
only.

> Security check for untrusted docker image
> -----------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: YARN-7516
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-7516
>             Project: Hadoop YARN
>          Issue Type: Sub-task
>            Reporter: Eric Yang
>            Assignee: Eric Yang
>         Attachments: YARN-7516.001.patch, YARN-7516.002.patch, YARN-7516.003.patch, YARN-7516.004.patch
>
>
> Hadoop YARN Services can support using private docker registry image or docker image
from docker hub.  In current implementation, Hadoop security is enforced through username
and group membership, and enforce uid:gid consistency in docker container and distributed
file system.  There is cloud use case for having ability to run untrusted docker image on
the same cluster for testing.  
> The basic requirement for untrusted container is to ensure all kernel and root privileges
are dropped, and there is no interaction with distributed file system to avoid contamination.
 We can probably enforce detection of untrusted docker image by checking the following:
> # If docker image is from public docker hub repository, the container is automatically
flagged as insecure, and disk volume mount are disabled automatically, and drop all kernel
capabilities.
> # If docker image is from private repository in docker hub, and there is a white list
to allow the private repository, disk volume mount is allowed, kernel capabilities follows
the allowed list.
> # If docker image is from private trusted registry with image name like "private.registry.local:5000/centos",
and white list allows this private trusted repository.  Disk volume mount is allowed, kernel
capabilities follows the allowed list.



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