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From "Eric Badger (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (YARN-7516) Security check for untrusted docker image
Date Wed, 03 Jan 2018 22:04:00 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-7516?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16310344#comment-16310344
] 

Eric Badger commented on YARN-7516:
-----------------------------------

{quote}
+  public static final String TRUSTED_DOCKER_REGISTRY = YARN_PREFIX +
+      "docker.trusted.registry";
{quote}
Is there a reason this doesn't use {{DOCKER_CONTAINER_RUNTIME_PREFIX}}?

I'm also wondering if this approach is consistent with what we went through with YARN-6623.
In that JIRA we moved all sensitive configs into container-executor.cfg so that they could
only be modified by root. By putting this property in yarn-site.xml, it is modifiable if the
yarn user is compromised. So, if we assume a compromised yarn user, then this property won't
stop an attacker from running arbitrary untrusted images. I think we should add this config
to container-executor.cfg so that the property is guaranteed to be safe unless the attacker
has gained root access. 

[~miklos.szegedi@cloudera.com], [~vvasudev], [~shanekumpf@gmail.com], thoughts on this?

> Security check for untrusted docker image
> -----------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: YARN-7516
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-7516
>             Project: Hadoop YARN
>          Issue Type: Sub-task
>            Reporter: Eric Yang
>            Assignee: Eric Yang
>         Attachments: YARN-7516.001.patch, YARN-7516.002.patch, YARN-7516.003.patch, YARN-7516.004.patch
>
>
> Hadoop YARN Services can support using private docker registry image or docker image
from docker hub.  In current implementation, Hadoop security is enforced through username
and group membership, and enforce uid:gid consistency in docker container and distributed
file system.  There is cloud use case for having ability to run untrusted docker image on
the same cluster for testing.  
> The basic requirement for untrusted container is to ensure all kernel and root privileges
are dropped, and there is no interaction with distributed file system to avoid contamination.
 We can probably enforce detection of untrusted docker image by checking the following:
> # If docker image is from public docker hub repository, the container is automatically
flagged as insecure, and disk volume mount are disabled automatically, and drop all kernel
capabilities.
> # If docker image is from private repository in docker hub, and there is a white list
to allow the private repository, disk volume mount is allowed, kernel capabilities follows
the allowed list.
> # If docker image is from private trusted registry with image name like "private.registry.local:5000/centos",
and white list allows this private trusted repository.  Disk volume mount is allowed, kernel
capabilities follows the allowed list.



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