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From "Craig Welch (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (YARN-2198) Remove the need to run NodeManager as privileged account for Windows Secure Container Executor
Date Mon, 29 Sep 2014 23:39:35 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-2198?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=14152523#comment-14152523
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Craig Welch commented on YARN-2198:
-----------------------------------

pom.xml - don’t see a /etc/hadoop or a wsce-site.xml, missed?

RawLocalFileSystem

Is someone from HDFS looking at this?

protected boolean mkOneDir(File p2f) throws IOException - nit, generalize arg name pls

return (parent == null || parent2f.exists() || mkdirs(parent)) &&
+      (mkOneDir(p2f) || p2f.isDirectory());

so, I don't get this logic, & believe it will fail if the path exists and is not a directory.
 Why not just do if p2f doesn't exist mkdirs(p2f)? seems much simpler, and drops the need
for mkOneDir

NativeIO

Elevated class - I believe this is Windows specific, "WindowsElevated" or "ElevatedWindows"?
 Why doesn't it extend "Windows" - I don't think secure and insecure windows should become
"wholly dissimilar"

createTaskAsUser, killTask, ProcessStub:

These aren't really "io", I think they should be factored out to their own process-specific
class


> Remove the need to run NodeManager as privileged account for Windows Secure Container
Executor
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: YARN-2198
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-2198
>             Project: Hadoop YARN
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>            Reporter: Remus Rusanu
>            Assignee: Remus Rusanu
>              Labels: security, windows
>         Attachments: .YARN-2198.delta.10.patch, YARN-2198.1.patch, YARN-2198.2.patch,
YARN-2198.3.patch, YARN-2198.delta.4.patch, YARN-2198.delta.5.patch, YARN-2198.delta.6.patch,
YARN-2198.delta.7.patch, YARN-2198.separation.patch, YARN-2198.trunk.10.patch, YARN-2198.trunk.4.patch,
YARN-2198.trunk.5.patch, YARN-2198.trunk.6.patch, YARN-2198.trunk.8.patch, YARN-2198.trunk.9.patch
>
>
> YARN-1972 introduces a Secure Windows Container Executor. However this executor requires
the process launching the container to be LocalSystem or a member of the a local Administrators
group. Since the process in question is the NodeManager, the requirement translates to the
entire NM to run as a privileged account, a very large surface area to review and protect.
> This proposal is to move the privileged operations into a dedicated NT service. The NM
can run as a low privilege account and communicate with the privileged NT service when it
needs to launch a container. This would reduce the surface exposed to the high privileges.

> There has to exist a secure, authenticated and authorized channel of communication between
the NM and the privileged NT service. Possible alternatives are a new TCP endpoint, Java RPC
etc. My proposal though would be to use Windows LPC (Local Procedure Calls), which is a Windows
platform specific inter-process communication channel that satisfies all requirements and
is easy to deploy. The privileged NT service would register and listen on an LPC port (NtCreatePort,
NtListenPort). The NM would use JNI to interop with libwinutils which would host the LPC client
code. The client would connect to the LPC port (NtConnectPort) and send a message requesting
a container launch (NtRequestWaitReplyPort). LPC provides authentication and the privileged
NT service can use authorization API (AuthZ) to validate the caller.



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