hadoop-yarn-dev mailing list archives

Site index · List index
Message view « Date » · « Thread »
Top « Date » · « Thread »
From larry mccay <lmc...@apache.org>
Subject Re: [DISCUSS] Feature Branch Merge and Security Audits
Date Wed, 25 Oct 2017 18:50:24 GMT
Terrific additions, Mike!
I will spin a new revision and incorporate your additions.

#8 is a great topic - given that Hadoop is insecure by default.
Actual movement to Secure by Default would be a challenge both technically
(given the need for kerberos) and discussion-wise.
Asking whether you have considered any settings of configurations that can
be secure by default is an interesting idea.

Can you provide an example though?


On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 2:14 PM, Michael Yoder <myoder@cloudera.com> wrote:

> On Sat, Oct 21, 2017 at 8:47 AM, larry mccay <lmccay@apache.org> wrote:
>
>> New Revision...
>>
>
> These lists are wonderful. I appreciate the split between the Tech Preview
> and the GA Readiness lists, with the emphasis on the former being "don't
> enable by default" or at least "don't enable if security is on".  I don't
> have any comments on that part.
>
> Additions inline below. If some of the additions are items covered by
> existing frameworks that any code would use, please forgive my ignorance.
> Also, my points aren't as succinct as yours. Feel free to reword.
>
> *GA Readiness Security Audit*
>> At this point, we are merging full or partial security model
>> implementations.
>> Let's inventory what is covered by the model at this point and whether
>> there are future merges required to be full.
>>
>> *1. UIs*
>>
>> 1.1. What sort of validation is being done on any accepted user input?
>> (pointers to code would be appreciated)
>> 1.2. What explicit protections have been built in for (pointers to code
>> would be appreciated):
>>   1.2.1. cross site scripting
>>   1.2.2. cross site request forgery
>>   1.2.3. click jacking (X-Frame-Options)
>>
>
> 1.2.4 If using cookies, is the secure flag for cookies
> <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SecureFlag> turned on?
>
>
>> 1.3. What sort of authentication is required for access to the UIs?
>>   1.3.1. Kerberos
>>     1.3.1.1. has TGT renewal been accounted for
>>     1.3.1.2. SPNEGO support?
>>     1.3.1.3. Delegation token?
>>   1.3.2. Proxy User ACL?
>> 1.4. What authorization is available for determining who can access what
>> capabilities of the UIs for either viewing, modifying data and/or related
>> processes?
>> 1.5. Is there any input that will ultimately be persisted in
>> configuration for executing shell commands or processes?
>> 1.6. Do the UIs support the trusted proxy pattern with doas impersonation?
>> 1.7. Is there TLS/SSL support?
>>
>
> 1.7.1 Is it possible to configure TLS protocols and cipher suites?
> 1.7.2 Is it possible to configure support for HTTP Strict Transport
> Security
> <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security_Cheat_Sheet>
> (HSTS)?
> 1.8 Are accesses to the UI audited? ("User X logged into Y from IP address
> Z", etc)
>
>
>> *2. REST APIs*
>>
>> 2.1. Do the REST APIs support the trusted proxy pattern with doas
>> impersonation capabilities?
>> 2.2. What explicit protections have been built in for:
>>   2.2.1. cross site scripting (XSS)
>>   2.2.2. cross site request forgery (CSRF)
>>   2.2.3. XML External Entity (XXE)
>> 2.3. What is being used for authentication - Hadoop Auth Module?
>> 2.4. Are there separate processes for the HTTP resources (UIs and REST
>> endpoints) or are they part of existing processes?
>> 2.5. Is there TLS/SSL support?
>> 2.6. Are there new CLI commands and/or clients for accessing the REST
>> APIs?
>> 2.7. What authorization enforcement points are there within the REST APIs?
>>
>
> The TLS and audit comments above apply here, too.
>
>
>> *3. Encryption*
>>
>> 3.1. Is there any support for encryption of persisted data?
>> 3.2. If so, is KMS and the hadoop key command used for key management?
>> 3.3. KMS interaction with Proxy Users?
>>
>
> 3.4 Cryptography is hard. There are more obscure pitfalls in crypto than
> any other in computer science. Standard cryptographic libraries should
> always be used. Does this work attempt to create an encryption scheme or
> protocol? Does it have a "novel" or "unique" use of normal crypto?  There
> be dragons. Even normal-looking use of cryptography must be carefully
> reviewed.
> 3.5 If you need random bits for a security purpose, such as for a session
> token or a cryptographic key, you need a cryptographically approved place
> to acquire said bits. Use the SecureRandom class.
>
> *4. Configuration*
>>
>> 4.1. Are there any passwords or secrets being added to configuration?
>> 4.2. If so, are they accessed via Configuration.getPassword() to allow
>> for provisioning to credential providers?
>> 4.3. Are there any settings that are used to launch docker containers or
>> shell out command execution, etc?
>>
>
> +1. So good.
>
>
>> *5. HA*
>>
>> 5.1. Are there provisions for HA?
>> 5.2. Are there any single point of failures?
>>
>> *6. CVEs*
>>
>> Dependencies need to have been checked for known issues before we merge.
>> We don't however want to list any CVEs that have been fixed but not
>> released yet.
>>
>> 6.1. All dependencies checked for CVEs?
>>
>
> Big +1 for this, too.
>
> 7. Log Messages
>
> Do not write secrets or data into log files. This sounds obvious, but
> mistakes happen.
>
> 7.1 Do not log passwords, keys, security-related tokens, or any sensitive
> configuration item.
> 7.2 Do not log any user-supplied data, ever. Not even snippets of user
> data, such as “I had an error parsing this line of text: xxxx” where the
> xxxx’s are user data. You never know, it might contain secrets like credit
> card numbers.
>
> 8. Secure By Default
>
> Strive to be *secure by default*. This means that products should ship in
> a secure state, and only by human tuning be put into an insecure state.
> Exhibit A here is the MongoDB ransomware fiasco
> <https://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/mongodb/>, where the insecure-by-default
> MongoDB installation resulted in completely open instances of mongodb on
> the open internet.  Attackers removed or encrypted the data and left ransom
> notes behind. We don't want that sort of notoriety for hadoop. Granted,
> it's not always possible to turn on all security features: for example you
> have to have a KDC set up in order to enable Kerberos.
>
> 8.1 Are there settings or configurations that can be shipped in a
> default-secure state?
>
>
> Thanks again for putting this list together!
> -Mike
>
>
>

Mime
  • Unnamed multipart/alternative (inline, None, 0 bytes)
View raw message