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From "Allen Wittenauer (Commented) (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (MAPREDUCE-2858) MRv2 WebApp Security
Date Thu, 13 Oct 2011 17:37:12 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13126746#comment-13126746

Allen Wittenauer commented on MAPREDUCE-2858:

bq. Please do not discuss specific vulnerabilities here

Too bad.  Let's play break the system.

User connects to RM which is redirect to the AM through the proxy.  The AM has an embedded
object such as a flash animation or utilizes a trojan image.  (After all, it passes through
the white list since it is loaded from my AM).  We write the creds we just gained through
our hack to some place in HDFS... let's say /tmp.  Through an Oozie workflow that has a file
watch, I push the cookie/whatever i just gained back to my super secret lair hosting provider.
 (So even if you block data in and out of the grid, the workflow manager requires access out...)
 Now I can impersonate all of the Yahoo! employees I want through their cookie auth.

I'm fairly convinced that signing is the only way to go without turning the knobs so far up
that the AM is pretty useless (no images! no embedded objects! no links off the system! no
js at all! ... ) .  The cert could actually be verified by the RM to mark AM as trusted or
not trusted. 
> MRv2 WebApp Security
> --------------------
>                 Key: MAPREDUCE-2858
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858
>             Project: Hadoop Map/Reduce
>          Issue Type: Sub-task
>          Components: applicationmaster, mrv2, security
>    Affects Versions: 0.23.0
>            Reporter: Luke Lu
>            Assignee: Luke Lu
>            Priority: Blocker
>             Fix For: 0.23.0
> In MRv2, while the system servers (ResourceManager (RM), NodeManager (NM) and NameNode
(NN)) run as "trusted"
> system users, the application masters (AM) run as users who submit the application. While
this offers great flexibility
> to run multiple version of mapreduce frameworks (including their UI) on the same Hadoop
cluster, it has significant
> implication for the security of webapps (Please do not discuss company specific vulnerabilities
> Requirements:
> # Secure authentication for AM (for app/job level ACLs).
> # Webapp security should be optional via site configuration.
> # Support existing pluggable single sign on mechanisms.
> # Should not require per app/user configuration for deployment.
> # Should not require special site-wide DNS configuration for deployment.
> This the top jira for webapp security. A design doc/notes of threat-modeling and counter
measures will be posted on the wiki.

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