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From "Vinod Kumar Vavilapalli (Updated) (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Updated] (MAPREDUCE-3256) Authorization checks needed for AM->NM protocol
Date Fri, 28 Oct 2011 16:37:32 GMT

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-3256?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel

Vinod Kumar Vavilapalli updated MAPREDUCE-3256:

    Attachment: MAPREDUCE-3256-20111028.1.txt

Patch to fix the authorization of requests to ContainerManager. Rogue users cannot fake the
ContainerID or the Resource anymore.

(Was a fun patch, stepped through most of the RPC code :) ).
> Authorization checks needed for AM->NM protocol
> -----------------------------------------------
>                 Key: MAPREDUCE-3256
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-3256
>             Project: Hadoop Map/Reduce
>          Issue Type: Sub-task
>          Components: applicationmaster, mrv2, nodemanager, security
>    Affects Versions: 0.23.0
>            Reporter: Vinod Kumar Vavilapalli
>            Assignee: Vinod Kumar Vavilapalli
>            Priority: Blocker
>             Fix For: 0.23.0
>         Attachments: MAPREDUCE-3256-20111028.1.txt
> We already authenticate requests to NM from any AM. We also need to authorize the requests,
otherwise a rogue AM, *but with proper tokens and thus authenticated to talk to NM*, could
either launch or kill a container with different ContainerID. We have two options:
>  - Remove the explicit passing of the ContainerId as part of the API and instead get
it from the RPC layer. In this case, we will need a ContainerToken for each container.
>  - Do explicit authorization checks without relying on getting ContainerID from the RPC.
> One ContainerToken per container is a serious restriction. We anyways want to be able
to use application-ACLS to, say, stop containers owned by others. So I am going to take the
later route of explicit checks.

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