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From "Luke Lu (Commented) (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (MAPREDUCE-2858) MRv2 WebApp Security
Date Tue, 11 Oct 2011 21:45:12 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13125408#comment-13125408
] 

Luke Lu commented on MAPREDUCE-2858:
------------------------------------

bq. could you please explain the threat model ASAP so that I understand what we are trying
to prevent.

The main threat we're trying to prevent is request forgery (typically a rouge AM trying to
impersonate an admin or another user) via cookie theft or "clever" scripting.

The proxy prevents the cookie theft for none-js cases and js whitelisting prevents both cookie
theft and request forgery via js.

Note, this is also an issue in 0.20-security releases, where a "clever" user can use a rouge
redirecting jetty in map/reduce tasks and post a shortened URL in a help request in a bug/issue
ticket. But the threat surface area is a lot smaller than MRv2, where any node:port combination
is potentially a valid URL authority and that AMs are linked from RM.

For a more secure (preventing accidental clicks to rogue URLs) production deployment, I recommend
blocking (via firewall) external network access to all cluster nodes except the trusted nodes
(RM,NN) and only allow external http access to AM/NM via the proxy.

I'd like to thank the Y paranoid who wanted to remain anonymous :) for helpful discussions.

                
> MRv2 WebApp Security
> --------------------
>
>                 Key: MAPREDUCE-2858
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858
>             Project: Hadoop Map/Reduce
>          Issue Type: Sub-task
>          Components: applicationmaster, mrv2, security
>    Affects Versions: 0.23.0
>            Reporter: Luke Lu
>            Assignee: Luke Lu
>            Priority: Blocker
>             Fix For: 0.23.0
>
>
> In MRv2, while the system servers (ResourceManager (RM), NodeManager (NM) and NameNode
(NN)) run as "trusted"
> system users, the application masters (AM) run as users who submit the application. While
this offers great flexibility
> to run multiple version of mapreduce frameworks (including their UI) on the same Hadoop
cluster, it has significant
> implication for the security of webapps (Please do not discuss company specific vulnerabilities
here).
> Requirements:
> # Secure authentication for AM (for app/job level ACLs).
> # Webapp security should be optional via site configuration.
> # Support existing pluggable single sign on mechanisms.
> # Should not require per app/user configuration for deployment.
> # Should not require special site-wide DNS configuration for deployment.
> This the top jira for webapp security. A design doc/notes of threat-modeling and counter
measures will be posted on the wiki.

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