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From Eric Yang <ey...@hortonworks.com>
Subject Re: [DISCUSS]: securing ASF Hadoop releases out of the box
Date Thu, 05 Jul 2018 18:38:13 GMT
Hadoop default configuration aimed for user friendliness to increase adoption, and security
can be enabled one by one.  This approach is most problematic to security because system can
be compromised before all security features are turned on.  
Larry's proposal will add some safety to remind system admin if security is disabled.  However,
reducing the number of knobs on security configs are likely required to make the system secure
for the banner idea to work without writing too much guessing logic to determine if UI is
secured.  Penetration test can provide better insights of what hasn't been secured to improve
the next release.  Thankfully most Hadoop vendors have done this work periodically to help
the community secure Hadoop.

There are plenty of company advertised if you want security, use Kerberos.  This statement
is not entirely true.  Kerberos makes security more difficult to crack for external parties,
but it shouldn't be the only method to secure Hadoop.  When the Kerberos environment is larger
than Hadoop cluster, anyone within Kerberos environment can access Hadoop cluster freely without
restriction.  In large scale enterprises or some cloud vendors that sublet their resources,
this might not be acceptable.
From my point of view, a secure Hadoop release must default all settings to localhost only
and allow users to add more hosts through authorized white list of servers.  This will keep
security perimeter in check.  All wild card ACLs will need to be removed or default to current
user/current host only.  Proxy user/host ACL list must be enforced on http channels.  This
is basically realigning the default configuration to single node cluster or firewalled configuration.


´╗┐On 7/5/18, 8:24 AM, "larry mccay" <larry.mccay@gmail.com> wrote:

    Hi Steve -
    This is a long overdue DISCUSS thread!
    Perhaps the UIs can very visibly state (in red) "WARNING: UNSECURED UI
    ACCESS - OPEN TO COMPROMISE" - maybe even force a click through the warning
    to get to the page like SSL exceptions in the browser do?
    Similar tactic for UI access without SSL?
    A new AuthenticationFilter can be added to the filter chains that blocks
    API calls unless explicitly configured to be open and obvious log a similar
    On Wed, Jul 4, 2018 at 11:58 AM, Steve Loughran <stevel@hortonworks.com>
    > Bitcoins are profitable enough to justify writing malware to run on Hadoop
    > clusters & schedule mining jobs: there have been a couple of incidents of
    > this in the wild, generally going in through no security, well known
    > passwords, open ports.
    > Vendors of Hadoop-related products get to deal with their lockdown
    > themselves, which they often do by installing kerberos from the outset,
    > making users make up their own password for admin accounts, etc.
    > The ASF releases though: we just provide something insecure out the box
    > and some docs saying "use kerberos if you want security"
    > What we can do here?
    > Some things to think about
    > * docs explaining IN CAPITAL LETTERS why you need to lock down your
    > cluster to a private subnet or use Kerberos
    > * Anything which can be done to make Kerberos easier (?). I see there are
    > some oustanding patches for HADOOP-12649 which need review, but what else?
    > Could we have Hadoop determine when it's coming up on an open network and
    > start warning? And how?
    > At the very least, single node hadoop should be locked down. You shouldn't
    > have to bring up kerberos to run it like that. And for more sophisticated
    > multinode deployments, should the scripts refuse to work without kerberos
    > unless you pass in some argument like "--Dinsecure-clusters-permitted"
    > Any other ideas?
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