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From "Daryn Sharp (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (HADOOP-8803) Make Hadoop running more secure public cloud envrionment
Date Tue, 25 Sep 2012 15:19:09 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-8803?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13462858#comment-13462858
] 

Daryn Sharp commented on HADOOP-8803:
-------------------------------------

I admire the goal.  Perhaps I'm not understanding how you are solving the problem, but I have
serious reservations and feasibility concerns about path-based delegation tokens.

bq. 3. I include path information inside the token. So all the client need to do is preparing
right block token or delegation token with right path restrict info included.

The RPC layer is too low-level to understand the higher-level client protocol.  It just makes
a socket connection (with a token) and marshals data, so it knows nothing about a path.  How
exactly do you plan to both authenticate the connection, and then authorize the client paths
being accessed?

bq. 4. My prototype has not modified Hftp/webhdfs yet. But I think it is solvable by deferring
token initialization.

I think deferring the token init is insufficient since you must solve the same problems as
RPC.

The real crux of the issue is how and can the entire Hadoop stack be modified to support this
new token scheme.  Based on my experience doing a lot of token work, I believe it will be
exceedingly difficult, introduce incompatibilities, and be very difficult to maintain.

Maybe I've missed a detail in the long discussion, but I have the feeling you want to run
too many jobs as the same user.  If so, could you solve your problem by partitioning your
jobs based on some criteria to distinct users.  This may help contain the damage from a breach
w/o making extensive changes to hadoop.  
                
> Make Hadoop running more secure public cloud envrionment
> --------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: HADOOP-8803
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-8803
>             Project: Hadoop Common
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>          Components: fs, ipc, security
>    Affects Versions: 0.20.204.0
>            Reporter: Xianqing Yu
>              Labels: hadoop
>   Original Estimate: 2m
>  Remaining Estimate: 2m
>
> I am a Ph.D student in North Carolina State University. I am modifying the Hadoop's code
(which including most parts of Hadoop, e.g. JobTracker, TaskTracker, NameNode, DataNode) to
achieve better security.
>  
> My major goal is that make Hadoop running more secure in the Cloud environment, especially
for public Cloud environment. In order to achieve that, I redesign the currently security
mechanism and achieve following proprieties:
> 1. Bring byte-level access control to Hadoop HDFS. Based on 0.20.204, HDFS access control
is based on user or block granularity, e.g. HDFS Delegation Token only check if the file can
be accessed by certain user or not, Block Token only proof which block or blocks can be accessed.
I make Hadoop can do byte-granularity access control, each access party, user or task process
can only access the bytes she or he least needed.
> 2. I assume that in the public Cloud environment, only Namenode, secondary Namenode,
JobTracker can be trusted. A large number of Datanode and TaskTracker may be compromised due
to some of them may be running under less secure environment. So I re-design the secure mechanism
to make the damage the hacker can do to be minimized.
>  
> a. Re-design the Block Access Token to solve wildly shared-key problem of HDFS. In original
Block Access Token design, all HDFS (Namenode and Datanode) share one master key to generate
Block Access Token, if one DataNode is compromised by hacker, the hacker can get the key and
generate any  Block Access Token he or she want.
>  
> b. Re-design the HDFS Delegation Token to do fine-grain access control for TaskTracker
and Map-Reduce Task process on HDFS. 
>  
> In the Hadoop 0.20.204, all TaskTrackers can use their kerberos credentials to access
any files for MapReduce on HDFS. So they have the same privilege as JobTracker to do read
or write tokens, copy job file, etc.. However, if one of them is compromised, every critical
thing in MapReduce directory (job file, Delegation Token) is exposed to attacker. I solve
the problem by making JobTracker to decide which TaskTracker can access which file in MapReduce
Directory on HDFS.
>  
> For Task process, once it get HDFS Delegation Token, it can access everything belong
to this job or user on HDFS. By my design, it can only access the bytes it needed from HDFS.
>  
> There are some other improvement in the security, such as TaskTracker can not know some
information like blockID from the Block Token (because it is encrypted by my way), and HDFS
can set up secure channel to send data as a option.
>  
> By those features, Hadoop can run much securely under uncertain environment such as Public
Cloud. I already start to test my prototype. I want to know that whether community is interesting
about my work? Is that a value work to contribute to production Hadoop?

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