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From Eric Yang <ey...@hortonworks.com>
Subject Re: [DISCUSS] Feature Branch Merge and Security Audits
Date Fri, 20 Oct 2017 23:42:51 GMT
The check list looks good.  Some more items to add:

Kerberos
  TGT renewal
  SPNEGO support
  Delegation token
Proxy User ACL

CVE tracking list

We might want to start a security section for Hadoop wiki for each of the services and components.
This helps to track what has been completed.

How do we want to enforce security completeness?  Most features will not meet all security
requirements on merge day.

Regards,
Eric

On 10/20/17, 12:41 PM, "larry mccay" <lmccay@apache.org> wrote:

    Adding security@hadoop list as well...
    
    On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 2:29 PM, larry mccay <lmccay@apache.org> wrote:
    
    > All -
    >
    > Given the maturity of Hadoop at this point, I would like to propose that
    > we start doing explicit security audits of features at merge time.
    >
    > There are a few reasons that I think this is a good place/time to do the
    > review:
    >
    > 1. It represents a specific snapshot of where the feature stands as a
    > whole. This means that we can more easily identity the attack surface of a
    > given feature.
    > 2. We can identify any security gaps that need to be fixed before a
    > release that carries the feature can be considered ready.
    > 3. We - in extreme cases - can block a feature from merging until some
    > baseline of security coverage is achieved.
    > 4. The folks that are interested and able to review security aspects can't
    > scale for every iteration over every JIRA but can review the checklist and
    > follow pointers for specific areas of interest.
    >
    > I have provided an impromptu security audit checklist on the DISCUSS
    > thread for merging Ozone - HDFS-7240 into trunk.
    >
    > I don't want to pick on it particularly but I think it is a good way to
    > bootstrap this audit process and figure out how to incorporate it without
    > being too intrusive.
    >
    > The questions that I provided below are a mix of general questions that
    > could be on a standard checklist that you provide along with the merge
    > thread and some that are specific to what I read about ozone in the
    > excellent docs provided. So, we should consider some subset of the
    > following as a proposal for a general checklist.
    >
    > Perhaps, a shared document can be created to iterate over the list to fine
    > tune it?
    >
    > Any thoughts on this, any additional datapoints to collect, etc?
    >
    > thanks!
    >
    > --larry
    >
    > 1. UIs
    > I see there are at least two UIs - Storage Container Manager and Key Space
    > Manager. There are a number of typical vulnerabilities that we find in UIs
    >
    > 1.1. What sort of validation is being done on any accepted user input?
    > (pointers to code would be appreciated)
    > 1.2. What explicit protections have been built in for (pointers to code
    > would be appreciated):
    >   1.2.1. cross site scripting
    >   1.2.2. cross site request forgery
    >   1.2.3. click jacking (X-Frame-Options)
    > 1.3. What sort of authentication is required for access to the UIs?
    > 1.4. What authorization is available for determining who can access what
    > capabilities of the UIs for either viewing, modifying data or affecting
    > object stores and related processes?
    > 1.5. Are the UIs built with proxying in mind by leveraging X-Forwarded
    > headers?
    > 1.6. Is there any input that will ultimately be persisted in configuration
    > for executing shell commands or processes?
    > 1.7. Do the UIs support the trusted proxy pattern with doas impersonation?
    > 1.8. Is there TLS/SSL support?
    >
    > 2. REST APIs
    >
    > 2.1. Do the REST APIs support the trusted proxy pattern with doas
    > impersonation capabilities?
    > 2.2. What explicit protections have been built in for:
    >   2.2.1. cross site scripting (XSS)
    >   2.2.2. cross site request forgery (CSRF)
    >   2.2.3. XML External Entity (XXE)
    > 2.3. What is being used for authentication - Hadoop Auth Module?
    > 2.4. Are there separate processes for the HTTP resources (UIs and REST
    > endpoints) or are the part of existing HDFS processes?
    > 2.5. Is there TLS/SSL support?
    > 2.6. Are there new CLI commands and/or clients for access the REST APIs?
    > 2.7. Bucket Level API allows for setting of ACLs on a bucket - what
    > authorization is required here - is there a restrictive ACL set on creation?
    > 2.8. Bucket Level API allows for deleting a bucket - I assume this is
    > dependent on ACLs based access control?
    > 2.9. Bucket Level API to list bucket returns up to 1000 keys - is there
    > paging available?
    > 2.10. Storage Level APIs indicate “Signed with User Authorization” what
    > does this refer to exactly?
    > 2.11. Object Level APIs indicate that there is no ACL support and only
    > bucket owners can read and write - but there are ACL APIs on the Bucket
    > Level are they meaningless for now?
    > 2.12. How does a REST client know which Ozone Handler to connect to or am
    > I missing some well known NN type endpoint in the architecture doc
    > somewhere?
    >
    > 3. Encryption
    >
    > 3.1. Is there any support for encryption of persisted data?
    > 3.2. If so, is KMS and the hadoop key command used for key management?
    >
    > 4. Configuration
    >
    > 4.1. Are there any passwords or secrets being added to configuration?
    > 4.2. If so, are they accessed via Configuration.getPassword() to allow for
    > provisioning in credential providers?
    > 4.3. Are there any settings that are used to launch docker containers or
    > shell out any commands, etc?
    >
    > 5. HA
    >
    > 5.1. Are there provisions for HA?
    > 5.2. Are we leveraging the existing HA capabilities in HDFS?
    > 5.3. Is Storage Container Manager a SPOF?
    > 5.4. I see HA listed in future work in the architecture doc - is this
    > still an open issue?
    >
    

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