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From larry mccay <lmc...@apache.org>
Subject Re: [DISCUSS] Feature Branch Merge and Security Audits
Date Sat, 21 Oct 2017 00:41:45 GMT
Hi Eric -

Thanks for the additional item suggestions!

"We might want to start a security section for Hadoop wiki for each of the
services and components.
This helps to track what has been completed."

Do you mean to keep the audit checklist for each service and component
there?
Interesting idea, I wonder what sort of maintenance that implies and
whether we want to take on that burden even though it would be great
information to have for future reviewers.

"How do we want to enforce security completeness?  Most features will not
meet all security requirements on merge day."

This is a really important question and point.
Maybe we should have started with goals and intents before the actual list.

My high level goals:

1. To have a holistic idea of what a given feature (or merge) is bringing
to the table in terms of attack surface
2. To understand the level of security that intended for the feature in its
endstate (GA)
3. To fully understand the stated level of security that is in place at the
time of each merge
4. To ensure that a merge meets some minimal bar for not adding security
vulnerabilities to deployments of a release or even builds from trunk. Not
the least of which is whether it is enabled by default and what it means to
disabled.
5. To be as unobtrusive to the branch committers as possible while still
communicating what we need for security review.
6. To have a reasonable checklist of security concerns that may or may not
apply to each merge but should be at least thought about in the final
security model design for the particular feature.

I think that feature merges often span multiple branch merges with security
coming in phases or other aspects of the feature.
This intent should maybe be part of the checklist itself so that we can
assess the audit with the level of scrutiny appropriate for the current
merge.

I will work on another revision of the list and incorporate your
suggestions as well.

thanks!

--larry

On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 7:42 PM, Eric Yang <eyang@hortonworks.com> wrote:

> The check list looks good.  Some more items to add:
>
> Kerberos
>   TGT renewal
>   SPNEGO support
>   Delegation token
> Proxy User ACL
>
> CVE tracking list
>
> We might want to start a security section for Hadoop wiki for each of the
> services and components.
> This helps to track what has been completed.
>
> How do we want to enforce security completeness?  Most features will not
> meet all security requirements on merge day.
>
> Regards,
> Eric
>
> On 10/20/17, 12:41 PM, "larry mccay" <lmccay@apache.org> wrote:
>
>     Adding security@hadoop list as well...
>
>     On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 2:29 PM, larry mccay <lmccay@apache.org>
> wrote:
>
>     > All -
>     >
>     > Given the maturity of Hadoop at this point, I would like to propose
> that
>     > we start doing explicit security audits of features at merge time.
>     >
>     > There are a few reasons that I think this is a good place/time to do
> the
>     > review:
>     >
>     > 1. It represents a specific snapshot of where the feature stands as a
>     > whole. This means that we can more easily identity the attack
> surface of a
>     > given feature.
>     > 2. We can identify any security gaps that need to be fixed before a
>     > release that carries the feature can be considered ready.
>     > 3. We - in extreme cases - can block a feature from merging until
> some
>     > baseline of security coverage is achieved.
>     > 4. The folks that are interested and able to review security aspects
> can't
>     > scale for every iteration over every JIRA but can review the
> checklist and
>     > follow pointers for specific areas of interest.
>     >
>     > I have provided an impromptu security audit checklist on the DISCUSS
>     > thread for merging Ozone - HDFS-7240 into trunk.
>     >
>     > I don't want to pick on it particularly but I think it is a good way
> to
>     > bootstrap this audit process and figure out how to incorporate it
> without
>     > being too intrusive.
>     >
>     > The questions that I provided below are a mix of general questions
> that
>     > could be on a standard checklist that you provide along with the
> merge
>     > thread and some that are specific to what I read about ozone in the
>     > excellent docs provided. So, we should consider some subset of the
>     > following as a proposal for a general checklist.
>     >
>     > Perhaps, a shared document can be created to iterate over the list
> to fine
>     > tune it?
>     >
>     > Any thoughts on this, any additional datapoints to collect, etc?
>     >
>     > thanks!
>     >
>     > --larry
>     >
>     > 1. UIs
>     > I see there are at least two UIs - Storage Container Manager and Key
> Space
>     > Manager. There are a number of typical vulnerabilities that we find
> in UIs
>     >
>     > 1.1. What sort of validation is being done on any accepted user
> input?
>     > (pointers to code would be appreciated)
>     > 1.2. What explicit protections have been built in for (pointers to
> code
>     > would be appreciated):
>     >   1.2.1. cross site scripting
>     >   1.2.2. cross site request forgery
>     >   1.2.3. click jacking (X-Frame-Options)
>     > 1.3. What sort of authentication is required for access to the UIs?
>     > 1.4. What authorization is available for determining who can access
> what
>     > capabilities of the UIs for either viewing, modifying data or
> affecting
>     > object stores and related processes?
>     > 1.5. Are the UIs built with proxying in mind by leveraging
> X-Forwarded
>     > headers?
>     > 1.6. Is there any input that will ultimately be persisted in
> configuration
>     > for executing shell commands or processes?
>     > 1.7. Do the UIs support the trusted proxy pattern with doas
> impersonation?
>     > 1.8. Is there TLS/SSL support?
>     >
>     > 2. REST APIs
>     >
>     > 2.1. Do the REST APIs support the trusted proxy pattern with doas
>     > impersonation capabilities?
>     > 2.2. What explicit protections have been built in for:
>     >   2.2.1. cross site scripting (XSS)
>     >   2.2.2. cross site request forgery (CSRF)
>     >   2.2.3. XML External Entity (XXE)
>     > 2.3. What is being used for authentication - Hadoop Auth Module?
>     > 2.4. Are there separate processes for the HTTP resources (UIs and
> REST
>     > endpoints) or are the part of existing HDFS processes?
>     > 2.5. Is there TLS/SSL support?
>     > 2.6. Are there new CLI commands and/or clients for access the REST
> APIs?
>     > 2.7. Bucket Level API allows for setting of ACLs on a bucket - what
>     > authorization is required here - is there a restrictive ACL set on
> creation?
>     > 2.8. Bucket Level API allows for deleting a bucket - I assume this is
>     > dependent on ACLs based access control?
>     > 2.9. Bucket Level API to list bucket returns up to 1000 keys - is
> there
>     > paging available?
>     > 2.10. Storage Level APIs indicate “Signed with User Authorization”
> what
>     > does this refer to exactly?
>     > 2.11. Object Level APIs indicate that there is no ACL support and
> only
>     > bucket owners can read and write - but there are ACL APIs on the
> Bucket
>     > Level are they meaningless for now?
>     > 2.12. How does a REST client know which Ozone Handler to connect to
> or am
>     > I missing some well known NN type endpoint in the architecture doc
>     > somewhere?
>     >
>     > 3. Encryption
>     >
>     > 3.1. Is there any support for encryption of persisted data?
>     > 3.2. If so, is KMS and the hadoop key command used for key
> management?
>     >
>     > 4. Configuration
>     >
>     > 4.1. Are there any passwords or secrets being added to configuration?
>     > 4.2. If so, are they accessed via Configuration.getPassword() to
> allow for
>     > provisioning in credential providers?
>     > 4.3. Are there any settings that are used to launch docker
> containers or
>     > shell out any commands, etc?
>     >
>     > 5. HA
>     >
>     > 5.1. Are there provisions for HA?
>     > 5.2. Are we leveraging the existing HA capabilities in HDFS?
>     > 5.3. Is Storage Container Manager a SPOF?
>     > 5.4. I see HA listed in future work in the architecture doc - is this
>     > still an open issue?
>     >
>
>
>

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