Return-Path: Delivered-To: apmail-geronimo-dev-archive@www.apache.org Received: (qmail 94917 invoked from network); 19 Jan 2009 17:33:04 -0000 Received: from hermes.apache.org (HELO mail.apache.org) (140.211.11.2) by minotaur.apache.org with SMTP; 19 Jan 2009 17:33:04 -0000 Received: (qmail 63955 invoked by uid 500); 19 Jan 2009 17:33:02 -0000 Delivered-To: apmail-geronimo-dev-archive@geronimo.apache.org Received: (qmail 63911 invoked by uid 500); 19 Jan 2009 17:33:02 -0000 Mailing-List: contact dev-help@geronimo.apache.org; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk list-help: list-unsubscribe: List-Post: Reply-To: dev@geronimo.apache.org List-Id: Delivered-To: mailing list dev@geronimo.apache.org Received: (qmail 63901 invoked by uid 99); 19 Jan 2009 17:33:02 -0000 Received: from nike.apache.org (HELO nike.apache.org) (192.87.106.230) by apache.org (qpsmtpd/0.29) with ESMTP; Mon, 19 Jan 2009 09:33:02 -0800 X-ASF-Spam-Status: No, hits=1.2 required=10.0 tests=SPF_NEUTRAL X-Spam-Check-By: apache.org Received-SPF: neutral (nike.apache.org: local policy) Received: from [76.13.13.93] (HELO smtp110.prem.mail.ac4.yahoo.com) (76.13.13.93) by apache.org (qpsmtpd/0.29) with SMTP; Mon, 19 Jan 2009 17:32:53 +0000 Received: (qmail 77134 invoked from network); 19 Jan 2009 17:32:32 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Macintosh.local) (dwoods@75.177.173.152 with plain) by smtp110.prem.mail.ac4.yahoo.com with SMTP; 19 Jan 2009 17:32:31 -0000 X-YMail-OSG: 7d4ZY2EVM1laehh4tWERSk4iFxddAEugftktXLtiqO9EqkGG3.iTcBY7i92FjwovLhNcL8TqNTeOyIdYsTPuqukgjovjZ.czvrUyeLNnhhhaBg7jR0p3EKn8CB40JyB3cIx8d.ryhvepHoEyEsTxTAQJ_f4NXP1R9dDTNN2rsOxojp8h7vJ.TD48IDHBtZMzh5LdkaaChN77kTW5ucsfc6S2ZPv8kRM- X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3 Message-ID: <4974B92F.7060502@apache.org> Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 12:32:31 -0500 From: Donald Woods User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.19 (Macintosh/20081209) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: dev@geronimo.apache.org Subject: Re: [DISCUSS] Security Vulnerability Policy created References: <49748AAA.6040009@apache.org> <4974B37A.6020004@earthlink.net> In-Reply-To: <4974B37A.6020004@earthlink.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Checked: Checked by ClamAV on apache.org Joe Bohn wrote: > Is the omission of any discussion of a JIRA intentional? In other > words, is it expected that a JIRA will *not* be created to document or > track the code change and that CVE will be the only documentation of the > issue (and then only after a server image has already been released by > changing the commit log)? Good point. I believe we should create the JIRA as part of step #9. > > If we are not creating a JIRA, then this brings up a documentation > issue. Not announcing the issue until after a server release also > causes some doc issues. > - We typically use JIRAs to identify all changes within a release. > - We include the list of JIRAs fixed and outstanding within the > RELEASE_NOTES for each server release. > - The RELEASE_NOTES are included in the server images so that anyone > downloading a server image can easily understand what issues are > resolved or still outstanding with that release. > - So typically JIRAs must be resolved before we create a release > candidate. The entire release (including the release notes) is then > validated during the vote for the release candidate. > > Security fixes are important, so it seems that they should be mentioned > in the release notes. I also understand the sensitive nature of these > issues and the possibility of exploitation. However, it seems that the > code check-in itself already has the potential to make the exposure > public for those watching carefully. > > One possible solution would be to announce the vulnerability once we > have a work-around available and/or a fix available in a SNAPSHOT image. Agree that we need to be as open as possible. As part of step #9, I'd like to see us add a reference to the fix (but not the complete details) on our Security pages for each release. Step #12 would also be updated, to go back and add the CVE number and more details to the Security pages as each branch is released. > This will substantially shorten the time between the code changes and > announce, thereby limiting possible exposure from those noticing or > discussing the purpose of code changes. I image that even innocent > questions about changes which are being inserted to resolve security > issues could result in an exposure becoming public in an ad hoc manner. > Waiting to validate a full release after code check-in might increase > the possibility that the exposure could be exploited. And what happens > if there are other issues with the release that cause it to drag on > longer than expected? > > However, a user can make an informed decision on how to proceed if we > announce the resolution in a SNAPSHOT and they will get the information > much more quickly. It will also allow the project to document the issue > correctly in a formal release and address any other issues that arise in > the release process. > > Joe > > Donald Woods wrote: >> There was a long discussion around mid-December on the private and >> security Geronimo mailing lists about how to handle security >> vulnerabilities. The outcome of that discussion (which is mainly a >> boilerplate suggested by Mark Thomas for all projects to use) can be >> found on our Project Policies wiki page at - >> http://cwiki.apache.org/GMOxPMGT/geronimo-project-policies.html >> >> If you see anything that needs changing or information that needs to >> be added, then please discuss on this thread. >> >> >> Thanks, >> Apache Geronimo PMC >> > >