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From Dan Smith <dsm...@pivotal.io>
Subject Re: [PROPOSAL]: Improve OQL Method Invocation Security
Date Wed, 03 Jul 2019 18:21:43 GMT
With Juan's proposal, the user still has the option to use java's security
manager. They can install a MethodAuthorizor that allows all methods and
use a java SecurityManager to restrict method access to the methods they
want.

Regarding the question of "How far should we go to prevent users from
shooting themselves in the foot?" I think we do need to honor the security
policies that administrators have configured for geode. Since we allow the
administrators to configure the system to give certain users READ but not
WRITE access, it's on us to make sure those users are not allowed to modify
the data. If users with READ access can modify data, that is a security
vulnerability in Geode.

-Dan


On Wed, Jul 3, 2019 at 8:33 AM Juan José Ramos <jramos@pivotal.io> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> Thanks for the feedback provided so far.
> I'm still resilient to add the *Java Security Manager* as an option, maybe
> it's due to my lack of experience around the subject but I still believe it
> is killing mosquitoes with a bazooka. We need to prevent this "bad things"
> only from within the OQL execution, and also provide our users with the
> means to customize the behaviour on their own desire, meaning that the
> configurable *Authorizer* stuff is still needed (it's up to them if they
> want to re-introduce CVE-2017-9795).
> Either way, this is not my decision to make, it's up to the community to
> decide. I'll go ahead and update the proposal, we can have another feedback
> round (1 week) and cast votes afterwards.
> Cheers.
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 2, 2019 at 5:23 PM Jason Huynh <jhuynh@pivotal.io> wrote:
>
> > Are security manager policies modifiable on the fly?  Just wondering if
> > someone decides they want to disallow or allow something, will they need
> to
> > restart their vms/geode node?
> >
> > I think Dan pointed this out earlier in the thread, but just wanted to
> have
> > us consider the original cve that led to the heavy handed deny all method
> > invocations:
> >
> >   CVE-2017-9795 Apache Geode OQL method invocation vulnerability
> >
> >   Description:
> >   A malicious user with read access to specific regions within a Geode
> >   cluster may execute OQL queries that allow read and write access to
> >   objects within unauthorized regions.  In addition a user could invoke
> >   methods that allow remote code execution
> >
> > I think Juan's proposal would still allow us to provide multiple
> solutions
> > that may or may not reopen that hole, but it would be up to the user to
> > decide what they are willing to accept.  The choice for what should be
> > default would still be up for debate...
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jul 2, 2019 at 1:07 PM Jacob Barrett <jbarrett@pivotal.io>
> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > > On Jul 2, 2019, at 11:58 AM, Juan José Ramos <jramos@pivotal.io>
> > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Hello Jake,
> > > >
> > > > I've been doing some reading about the *Java Security Manager* and,
> > even
> > > > when it might work for our use case, I don't think is a good fit due
> to
> > > the
> > > > following reasons:
> > > > 1). We already have chosen *Shiro* for authentication and
> > authorization,
> > > > adding yet another security framework (and mapping between roles and
> > > > permissions between the two of them) for OQL method invocation
> security
> > > > seems overkilling to me. I'd rather spend some time improving the
> > > > *ResourcePermissionBasedMethodAuthorizer
> > >
> > > The security manager doesn’t have to be as fined grained as individual
> > > users. Do we really intend to support actions on objects base on
> current
> > > user too?
> > >
> > > > [1] *and/or adding *Permissions*/*Roles* to our current security
> > > framework
> > > > than introducing a new security framework altogether.
> > >
> > > Again, we don’t have to add anything. If the user wants to restrict
> > access
> > > to certain activities they could add a policy file to the JVM to do so.
> > It
> > > doesn’t have to be user based. We could simply have two hard coded
> roles,
> > > UserCode and SystemCode. SystemCode has AllPermissions, UserCode has
> > none.
> > > Now we run all queries under the context of UserCode and it can’t
> execute
> > > any File, Runtime, Socket, etc.
> > >
> > > > 2). There can only be one *Security Manager* per JVM at a given time
> > > Eh, sorta but no, you can use thread contexts and class loader
> isolation,
> > > but there really doesn’t need to be more than one.
> > > .
> > > > 3). Customers already using a custom *Security Manager* on their own
> > will
> > > > be in trouble... we can certainly wrote our own implementation as a
> > > > composite and parse multiple policy files, but this will probably
> break
> > > the
> > > > backward compatibility for these customers (and requires yet more
> > > > configuration and things to keep in mind when upgrading).
> > > Their custom SecurityManager would conform to the same rules as the
> > > default file based one in the JRE. They would be able to control code
> > > access using their existing framework. Seems like win to me.
> > >
> > > > 4). The current set of default *Permissions* (*PropertyPermission*,
> > > > *FilePermission*, etc.) don't apply to our use case, so we'll need to
> > > > create our own implementations and do some plumbing to map to what we
> > > > currently have in terms of principals and roles (more boilerplate).
> > >
> > > How do they not apply?
> > >
> > > > 5). In order to check a permission we basically need to check
> whether a
> > > > Security Manager is installed (*System.getSecurityManager() != null*)
> > and
> > > > execute the check afterwards
> > (*securityManager**.checkPermission(perm)*);
> > > > the *Security Manager* then looks at the classes of all methods
> > currently
> > > > within the call stack (roughly speaking) and returns or throws an
> > > > exception... a lookup through a simple Map is probably faster, and
> > easier
> > > > to maintain and read.
> > >
> > > All the things we need to be protected from have already been coded
> with
> > > these checks in the JRE. Do you think we need to protect other
> > activities?
> > >
> > > -Jake
> > >
> > >
> >
>
>
> --
> Juan José Ramos Cassella
> Senior Technical Support Engineer
> Email: jramos@pivotal.io
> Office#: +353 21 4238611
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>
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