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From "John Omernik (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (DRILL-3820) Nested Directories : Metadata Cache in a directory stores information from sub-directories as well creating security issues
Date Wed, 23 Mar 2016 12:43:25 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DRILL-3820?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=15208350#comment-15208350
] 

John Omernik commented on DRILL-3820:
-------------------------------------

This is likely related to my issue here: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DRILL-4143

First thought: Is there any sensitive data in the metadata cache that can be leaked to a user
who doesn't have access to the directories?  If so, we need validate the user running the
query has access to the data prior to providing that information from the cache. 

Then, I would agree with Rahul, read and write with the drillbit process user. However, what
happens in situation where the drillbit process user doesn't have access to the directories
but the impersonated user does?  Is it a requirement that with impersonation, that the drillbit
process user has access to the data?  If it doesn't, how would it write the files?  

If this is a requirement (I don't think it is) (that the drillbit process data also has access
to the data) then the answer here is simple: metadata reads and writes as drillbit process
user, and can be issued by anyone. (Don't queries that notice that the metadata is out of
date or missing try to create it by default?

Should metadata operations be privileged? This is a tricky subject in that I think as I have
mentioned earlier, if Drill sees things out of data, missing metadata it tries to refresh
on it's own.  Thus indicating to me, meta data operations should not be privileged.    Hmm...
tricky issue :) 

> Nested Directories : Metadata Cache in a directory stores information from sub-directories
as well creating security issues
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: DRILL-3820
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DRILL-3820
>             Project: Apache Drill
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: Metadata
>            Reporter: Rahul Challapalli
>            Assignee: Parth Chandra
>            Priority: Critical
>             Fix For: 1.7.0
>
>
> git.commit.id.abbrev=3c89b30
> User A has access to lineitem folder and its subfolders
> User B had access to lineitem folder but not its sub-folders.
> Now when User A runs the "refresh table metadata lineitem" command, the cache file gets
created under lineitem folder. This file contains information from the underlying sub-directories
as well.
> Now User B can download this file and get access to information which he should not be
seeing in the first place.
> This can be very easily reproducible if impersonation is enabled on the cluster.
> Let me know if you need more information to reproduce this issue



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