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From Mike Matrigali <mikem_...@sbcglobal.net>
Subject Re: Derby secure by default
Date Mon, 19 Sep 2011 22:20:04 GMT
Roy.Minet@comcast.net wrote:
> Installing a new version should always be backward compatible and not 
> break anything in existing applications.  If things don't work this way, 
> it's bound to be (unncessarily) disruptive to some, and especially those 
> less sophisticated and less able to figure out and fix problems.  I see 
> no reason why anyone who wishes to utilize the new capabilities would 
> have any problem with setting the new property when they are ready to do 
> so.  Security is obviously important, especially for networked 
> applications.  I think it's also important not to do anything that 
> interferes with embedded applications designed to require ZERO 
> administration.
> 
+1

I think that new features that rick is proposing are valuable to some
set of Derby users, and welcome their inclusion in Derby.  Having one
flag to enable a set of secure oriented features also seems reasonable
as long as users can still pick and choose if they don't want the 
complete set.  I don't think
they should be made the default in the current release or a future release.

I believe zero admin upgrade/backward compatibility has been a great 
feature for Derby so far and we should do whatever we can to not break 
it going forward.  It seems like applications that need this feature set
can set the appropriate flag going forward and then do the work to 
properly configure authentication and authorization, ssl encryption 
passwords, and other server administration.  Since there is extra work
necessary to use these features it seems reasonable to put to work on
these applications to set the flag rather than put the work on the 
zero-admin applications that do not need these features.

By default Derby should be zero admin and thus default to not requiring
this extra administration.


> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From: *"Rick Hillegas" <rick.hillegas@oracle.com>
> *To: *"Derby Discussion" <derby-user@db.apache.org>
> *Sent: *Monday, September 19, 2011 12:39:07 PM
> *Subject: *Derby secure by default
> 
> The Derby developers are considering introducing a single master
> security property. Turning this property on will enable most Derby
> security mechanisms:
> 
> 1) Authentication - Will be on, requiring username/password credentials
> at connection time. Derby will supply a default authentication mechanism.
> 
> 2) SQL authorization - Will be on, hiding a user's data from other
> people. In addition, Derby will support more SQL Standard protections
> for Java routines.
> 
> 3) File permissions - Will be tightened as described by DERBY-5363.
> 
> 4) PUBLIC -This keyword will not be allowed as a user name.
> 
> 5) SSL/TLS encryption - Will shield client/server traffic.
> 
> 6) Server administration -  Will require credentials.
> 
> When the property is off, Derby will behave as it does today:
> Authentication, authorization, and network encryption will be off, file
> permissions will inherit defaults from the account which runs the VM,
> PUBLIC will be a legal user name, and server administration won't need
> credentials.
> 
> This new master property will make it easier to configure a more secure
> application. We want to introduce the property in an upcoming 10.x
> release, where it will default to being off. That means that it won't
> cause compatibility problems.
> 
> Later on, we might change the default for this property so that it would
> normally be turned on. This would make Derby more secure out of the box
> at the cost of breaking existing applications. Many applications would
> need to explicitly turn the property off in order to run as they did
> previously. Release notes would document this behavioral change and we
> would bump the major release id from 10 to 11 in order to call attention
> to the change.
> 
> We would like your feedback on this trade-off between security out of
> the box versus disruption. Should this extra security be enabled by default?
> 
> Thanks,
> -Rick
> 


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