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Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 21:04:57 +0000 (UTC)
From: "Dag H. Wanvik (Created) (JIRA)" <jira@apache.org>
To: derby-dev@db.apache.org
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Subject: [jira] [Created] (DERBY-5622) Reduce the chance for hash collisions
 when checking bootPassword at boot time and when changing password.
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Reduce the chance for hash collisions when checking bootPassword at boot time and when changing password.
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                 Key: DERBY-5622
                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-5622
             Project: Derby
          Issue Type: Improvement
          Components: Store
            Reporter: Dag H. Wanvik


There are two issues, already seen in DERBY-2687:

   "the boot issue": there is a 1/2**16 chance that a wrong bootpassword will allow boot to proceed (but since its decoded key is wrong the boot will fail).
   "the oassword change" issue: similarly, there is a chance that the wrong bootpassword will be accepted trying to change it via 
    SYSCS_UTIL.SYSCS_SET_DATABASE_PROPERTY('bootPassword', ...) at least for algorithms that do not check IV (initialization vector) in addition to the
    digest, e.g. "DES/ECB/NoPadding"

The latter case may lead to data corruption, cf. DERBY-2687 discussion. I think the risk is fairly low, though: One would need to have execution permission to change the property if SQL authorization is used, and in most scenarios the supplied existing password would be correct. But since the results can be bad, it would be good to reduce or eliminate the risk.


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