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From "Martin Zaun (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] Updated: (DERBY-2109) System privileges
Date Wed, 27 Feb 2008 17:05:53 GMT

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
]

Martin Zaun updated DERBY-2109:
-------------------------------

    Attachment: DERBY-2109-10.diff
                DERBY-2109-10.stat

Please find attached patch update DERBY-2109-10 (replacing DERBY-2109-09):

a) Fixed AuthenticationTest (and other) failures; junit-all and derbyall run fine with the
patch on my machine.

b) Made the System Privileges checks only dependent upon the presence of a SecurityManager,
not upon Authentication, per derby-dev discussion "JMX meeting system authorization (DERBY-2109
& 1387)".

c) Moved class SecurityUtil from o.a.d.security to o.a.d.iapi.security, per suggestion by
Dan.

d) Investigated an issue with non-normalized names in policy files where a grant to user edWard
would not give permissions to the authenticated users edward or EDWARD but edWard only.

Bottomline: When evaluating permissions, the (Sun) Java Security Runtime uses the principal
names as found literally in the policy file and not as returned by SystemPrincipal.getName()
(where we could return normalized names).

As a workaround, our class SystemPrincipal could implement the non-standard interface com.sun.security.auth.PrincipalComparator,
which declares a method implies(Subject) that allows for Principals to match Subjects based
on normalized Authorization Identifiers, e.g., a policy grant  to edWard would give permissions
to all users edWard, edward, and EDWARD.  But then we'd be relying upon a non-standard Security
Runtime class and behaviour.  (Yet another approach would be to construct the Subject with
a Principal list having all lower/upper case combinations of an identifier, but that's clearly
not feasible.)

I changed classes SecurityUtil and SystemPrincipal and added javadoc comments reflecting that
- SystemPrincipal names are not Authorization Identifiers (i.e., non-delimited identifiers
handled case-insensitively by magic of SystemPrincipal);
- SecurityUtil constructs a Subject with two SystemPrincipals: one with the literal user name
and another with the normalized name.

For users who want to put specific principal grants into customized policy files this means:
- a grant to a principal named EDWARD gives permissions to all users edward, edWard, and EDWARD
(and all other lower/upper case spellings);
- a grant to principal edWard only gives permissions to the user edWard.

In my view that's still an acceptable and documentable behaviour; but as said, I haven't found
any other feasible workaround lifting the Java Security Runtime's literal handling of principal
names.

e) Added comments to SystemPrivilegesPermissionTest.java on the use of Subject.doAsPrivileged()
versus doAs() after further experiments with the Java Security Runtime.  Bottomline: doAsPrivileged()
is the only implementation option for our purposes.

f) The patch does not reflect the latest suggestions by Dan for the shutdown permission following
a new naming scheme (wanted to get this patch out and tested first).  But will look into it
and comment.

Martin


> System privileges
> -----------------
>
>                 Key: DERBY-2109
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
>             Project: Derby
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>          Components: Security
>    Affects Versions: 10.3.1.4
>            Reporter: Rick Hillegas
>            Assignee: Martin Zaun
>         Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat, derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff,
DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat, DERBY-2109-05and06.diff, DERBY-2109-05and06.stat,
DERBY-2109-07.diff, DERBY-2109-07.stat, DERBY-2109-08.diff, DERBY-2109-08.stat, DERBY-2109-08_addendum.diff,
DERBY-2109-08_addendum.stat, DERBY-2109-09.diff, DERBY-2109-09.stat, DERBY-2109-10.diff, DERBY-2109-10.stat,
SystemPrivilegesBehaviour.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the related email
discussion at http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more  secure in a client/server
configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server security holes in 10.3. In particular,
I'd like to focus on  authorization issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently  Functions/Procedures, but someday
Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following  database-specific issues,
via granting execute privilege to system  procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been controlled
by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and derby.database.defaultConnectionMode)
as described in the security section of the Developer's Guide (see http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).

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