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From "Martin Zaun (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] Commented: (DERBY-2109) System privileges
Date Thu, 17 Jan 2008 08:04:40 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12559853#action_12559853

Martin Zaun commented on DERBY-2109:

> John H. Embretsen wrote:
> I have found the wildcard value of * for principal_name mentioned only in the JDK7 docs,
but I tried it on Sun's JVMs 1.4.2 and 1.5.0, and it worked the same way, as described. Not
sure if we can/should rely on that or not, and I don't know if other vendors do the same thing.

The javadocs of a 1.4 Sun JDK class
has a paragraph explicitly describing the use of * (recommended without double-quotes) as
wildcard for Principal names and classes (but that class has been deprecated for other reasons).

But the general concept of "*" as wildcard character in policy files is documented:

> Daniel John Debrunner wrote:
> Either way, it seems there are already mechanisms to specify all users, thus we don't
want to introduce another way of specifying all users by having a quoted *.
> Supporting PUBLIC as a DatabasePrincal name to represent all users could be a follow
on change. It might make it clearer for folks used to SQL authorization.

One can argue that with System Privileges (server shutdown, create database) we're in the
realm of Java Security, not SQL authorization, controlled by Java policy (file) permissions
in contrast to grants/revokes.

If we feel that we're at the intersection of SQL and Java Security and that we want to please
users with either background -- we can easily support both, PUBLIC and * as wildcard characters.
 Of course, allowing both rather adds to the documentation.

> System privileges
> -----------------
>                 Key: DERBY-2109
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
>             Project: Derby
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>          Components: Security
>    Affects Versions:
>            Reporter: Rick Hillegas
>            Assignee: Martin Zaun
>         Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat, derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff,
DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat, DERBY-2109-05and06.diff, DERBY-2109-05and06.stat,
DERBY-2109-07.diff, DERBY-2109-07.stat, DERBY-2109-08.diff, DERBY-2109-08.stat, DERBY-2109-08_addendum.diff,
DERBY-2109-08_addendum.stat, SystemPrivilegesBehaviour.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html,
systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the related email
discussion at http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more  secure in a client/server
configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server security holes in 10.3. In particular,
I'd like to focus on  authorization issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently  Functions/Procedures, but someday
Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following  database-specific issues,
via granting execute privilege to system  procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been controlled
by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and derby.database.defaultConnectionMode)
as described in the security section of the Developer's Guide (see http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).

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