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From "Martin Zaun (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] Updated: (DERBY-2109) System privileges
Date Thu, 04 Oct 2007 13:46:51 GMT

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel

Martin Zaun updated DERBY-2109:

    Attachment: DERBY-2109-05.diff

The attached document and patch is a 1st cut of the integration, and hence enforcement, of
System Privileges. This patch has gotten somewhat larger that I'd initially anticipated and
most likely needs further discussion.

Please start with the document SystemPrivilegesTestCases.html, which expands on the Functional
Specification and is meant for future inclusion into the spec.  There's a bit of a deviation
from the spec with regard to the case where no user credentials (username and password) are
given by the user, but the server's Policy has a general grant for System Privileges, for
instance, by a "wildcard" clause (DatabasePrinciple "*").  For this particular case allowing
the requested operation (Engine Shutdown, Create Database) appears justified and has the advantage
of backward compatibility.  Note that explicit user credentials can be easily enforced by
removing/restricting the "wildcard" grants in the server.policy.  This is the implemented
behaviour by the patch.  Which has the benefit that the function tests, which generally don't
provide credentials (for shutdown, for instance), pass -- due to the "wildcard" grant in the
default server.policy.  A stricter semantics that always required explicit user credentials
(when running under a SecurityManager), would require changes to the junit test framework
(provide user credentials in teardown(), for instance).  However, this point about a given
default identity may need further discussion.

With regard, to design decisions made for this patch: There's a question where to put the
checks that enforce System Privileges, whether to do them in services.monitor.BaseMonitor,
for instance, or rather in the jdbc layer (InternalDriver, EmbedConnection). The embedded
driver (as an outer layer) appears to be the better choice: there's a shutdown service, with
which the checks should probably not interfere, and the right exception types are all there
in the driver.  In addition, NetworkServerControl needs to perform a privilege check before
the shutdown URL is passed to the driver.

Looking forward to your comments,

> System privileges
> -----------------
>                 Key: DERBY-2109
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
>             Project: Derby
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>          Components: Security
>    Affects Versions:
>            Reporter: Rick Hillegas
>            Assignee: Martin Zaun
>         Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat, derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff,
DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat, DERBY-2109-05.diff, DERBY-2109-05.stat, SystemPrivilegesTestCases.html,
systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the related email
discussion at http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more  secure in a client/server
configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server security holes in 10.3. In particular,
I'd like to focus on  authorization issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently  Functions/Procedures, but someday
Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following  database-specific issues,
via granting execute privilege to system  procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been controlled
by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and derby.database.defaultConnectionMode)
as described in the security section of the Developer's Guide (see http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).

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