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From "Bryan Pendleton (JIRA)" <derby-...@db.apache.org>
Subject [jira] Commented: (DERBY-962) Upgrade default security mechanism in client to use encrypted userid password if client can support it.
Date Wed, 15 Feb 2006 18:55:09 GMT
    [ http://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-962?page=comments#action_12366521 ] 

Bryan Pendleton commented on DERBY-962:

I agree, Sunitha. If the user says something like:

connect 'jdbc:derby://localhost:1527/testdb;create=true;securityMechanism=4;user=bryan;password=bryan';

we should not quietly change the securityMechanism to 3 and quietly send the password in the
clear. That's a bad default to have.

The user has given us conflicting information, and we should ask them to either change the
securityMechanism to one which supports a password, or remove the password.

I can see the appeal of quietly upgrading to a secure securityMechanism (one which doesn't
expose the password over the wire), but in general my preference would be to give them an
error saying that their request is ambiguous, rather than trying to guess what sort of alternate
securityMechanism they may have wanted.

> Upgrade default security mechanism in client to use encrypted userid password if client
can support it.
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>          Key: DERBY-962
>          URL: http://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-962
>      Project: Derby
>         Type: Improvement
>   Components: Network Client
>     Reporter: Sunitha Kambhampati
>      Fix For:

> Currently in the client, if userid and password are set in the connection url, the default
security mechanism is upgraded to USRIDPWD (which is clear text userid and password).  This
seems to be a security hole here. 
> Current client  driver supports encrypted userid/password (EUSRIDPWD) via the use of
DH key-agreement protocol - however current Open Group DRDA specifications imposes small prime
and base generator values (256 bits) that prevents other JCE's  (apt from ibm jce) to be used
as java cryptography providers.  
> Some thoughts:
> -- client can make a check to see if it the jvm it is running in supports the encryption
necessary for EUSRIDPWD. If it supports, then the client can upgrade to EUSRIDPWD. 
> -- if the jvm the client is running is , doesnt support encryption requirements for EUSRIDPWD,
then the security mechanism will be set to USRIDPWD.
> -- DERBY-528 will add support for strong userid and password which is another option
to send encrypted passwords across the wire. When this gets added, maybe this can be considered
as one of the upgrade options after EUSRIDPWD. 

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