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From "Julius Davies (JIRA)" <>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (CXF-6143) SSL/TLS hostname verification does not strictly follow HTTPS RFC2818
Date Tue, 09 Dec 2014 19:26:12 GMT


Julius Davies commented on CXF-6143:

Here's trunk for that code:

> SSL/TLS hostname verification does not strictly follow HTTPS RFC2818
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>                 Key: CXF-6143
>                 URL:
>             Project: CXF
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: Transports
>    Affects Versions: 3.0.2
>            Reporter: Chad Loder
>            Assignee: Colm O hEigeartaigh
>              Labels: security,, ssl
> The HTTPS specification [RFC 2818, section 3.1|]
> {quote}
>    If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST
>    be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name
>    field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although
>    the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and
>    Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead.
> {quote}
> The current [CertificateHostnameVerifier|;a=blob;f=rt/transports/http/src/main/java/org/apache/cxf/transport/https/]
implementation in CXF does not follow this logic, even in STRICT mode. Instead, it builds
an array of both CNs and subjectAltNames and checks each of them sequentially, in the order
returned in the certificate.
> The proper approach would be to build a list of subjectAltNames having type dNSName.
If the list is non-empty, matching should proceed against this list ONLY - and validation
should fail if no subjectAltName matches. Otherwise, only if the subjectAltName list is empty,
a list of CNs from the Subject field should be built, and perhaps sorted from most- to least-specific.
A match should then proceed against this list, taking into account wildcards of course.
> Likewise, the [HostnameVerifier implementation in not-yet-commons-ssl|]
has the same issue. However, since not-yet-commons-ssl is a generic SSL/TLS transport library,
it should not be made to follow HTTPS application layer rules for all TLS connections - instead
a STRICT_HTTPS mode could be implemented for this purpose.
> For more information, see (for future reference
and background on where implementations are going) and

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