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From Jonathan Geddes <geddes.jonat...@gmail.com>
Subject Re: no 'writers' section in _security killing me
Date Mon, 11 Jul 2011 23:10:20 GMT
I totally agree that this should be built in. It doesn't seem like it would
be a very difficult change to implement.

--Jonathan

On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 5:02 PM, Andrew Stuart (SuperCoders) <
andrew.stuart@supercoders.com.au> wrote:

> Okay I understand now I think - essentially "write only" access control for
> a given user is not built-in.  Seems like a good thing to be part of the
> basic security model - does anyone else agree, or is the general consensus
> that this is not something that should be part of the access control model?
>
> as
>
>
>
>
>
> On 12/07/2011, at 8:48 AM, Jonathan Geddes wrote:
>
> Andrew,
>
> There's nothing built in, but there are apparently a couple of possible
> workarounds:
>
> 1. Use the '2.1 layer architecture': have something (like nodejs) listening
> for changes on the public database that moves the data to a private
> database
> and removes it from the public database.
>
> 2. Use the built-in rewriter to limit access to a given database to
> POST/PUT
> (don't allow GET through)
>
> --Jonathan
>
> On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 4:27 PM, Andrew Stuart (SuperCoders) <
> andrew.stuart@supercoders.com.**au <andrew.stuart@supercoders.com.au>>
> wrote:
>
>  Sorry I phrased that badly.
>>
>> Back in the days of Lotus Notes it was possible to have users who were
>> able
>> to write into, but not read from a database.  Is similar functionality
>> built
>> in to CouchDB or must it be enabled by external logic?
>>
>> as
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/07/2011, at 7:48 AM, Robert Newson wrote:
>>
>> how would one replicate these write-only dropboxes?
>>
>> B.
>>
>> On 11 July 2011 22:13, Andrew Stuart (SuperCoders)
>> <andrew.stuart@supercoders.****com.au <andrew.stuart@supercoders.**com.au<andrew.stuart@supercoders.com.au>
>> >>
>> wrote:
>>
>>  I've followed this thread but it's still somewhat unclear -
>>>
>>> -- is "write only" database access built in/easy to do, or must it be
>>> enabled via some special external logic imposed at the application layer?
>>>
>>> as
>>>
>>> On 12/07/2011, at 6:39 AM, Jonathan Geddes wrote:
>>>
>>> One more possible solution: Could I use the rewriter to make sure that
>>> that
>>> only POST and PUT go through to a given database? How secure is this
>>> approach?
>>>
>>> --Jonathan
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 8:45 AM, Jonathan Geddes
>>> <geddes.jonathan@gmail.com>****wrote:
>>>
>>> Thanks for the responses, everyone.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> So I've been using CouchDB for about a year, but I'm only now getting
>>>> into
>>>> the "2.1 Layer Architecture" (cutting back from a 3+ layer).
>>>>
>>>> Apparently I've been using readers and admins wrong all along. I thought
>>>> that only admins could write documents. After all, why would I think
>>>> that
>>>> 'readers' could write? I've been a victim of the misnomer!
>>>>
>>>> I still think that the dropbox feature would be immensely useful, and I
>>>> still might take a whack at implementing it.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for the clarification,
>>>>
>>>> --Jonathan
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 1:17 AM, Jason Smith <jhs@iriscouch.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 12:17 PM, Jonathan Geddes
>>>>
>>>>> <geddes.jonathan@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>  Fortunately, users with write access are not admins. They may not
>>>>>>> modify design documents. All of their changes are subject to
design
>>>>>>> documents' validate_doc_update() function.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would be *overjoyed* to hear that you are right and the
>>>>>> documentation
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> at
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> [0] is wrong:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> database admins - Defined per database. They have all the privileges
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> readers have plus the privileges: write (and edit) design documents,
>>>>>> add/remove database admins and readers, set the database revisions
>>>>>> limit
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (/somedb/_revs_limit API) and execute temporary views against the
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> database
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> (/somedb/_temp_view API). They can not create a database and neither
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> delete
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> a database.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> D'oh, Marcello posted a pithy and timely answer while I had lunch.
>>>>> I'll send anyway.
>>>>>
>>>>> The typical setup is:
>>>>>
>>>>> * 1 server admin
>>>>> * 0 or more database admins (name or roles in _security.admins)
>>>>> * An admin deploys a design document
>>>>> * Several normal users (name or roles in _security.readers but *not*
>>>>> admins)
>>>>>
>>>>> "readers" is a misnomer. It really means "members." Read access is
>>>>> database-wide, write access is at the pleasure of
>>>>> validate_doc_update().
>>>>>
>>>>> To that end, Chris changed CouchDB so that future releases will use
>>>>> the "members" field. He committed his change last Thanksgiving
>>>>> weekend. Thanks, Chris!
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm gonna set up a little experiment in the morning (when I can think
>>>>>
>>>>>> clearly) to find out for myself. The _revs_limit PI and temporary
>>>>>> views
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> are
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> scary too.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> I strongly encourage an experiment. 15 or 20 minutes of poking around
>>>>> will make things very clear.
>>>>>
>>>>> Cloudant has a brilliant UI to impose more intuitive and traditional
>>>>> security policies for exactly this reason.
>>>>>
>>>>> I call it a 2.5-layer architecture
>>>>>
>>>>>> because there is no middleware, but it still requires a third
>>>>>>> component, to watch over things. The drop box would be amazing;
>>>>>>> however I am still happy with my architecture because bugs or
crashes
>>>>>>> in the third component are not so devastating to the user experience.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> The great thing about this architecture is that you can easily have
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> CouchDB
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> monitor the third party stuff and keep it running with external OS
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> processes
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> [1]. I like the term '2.5-layer' :D.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Is it too late to change the name to "2.1-layer"?
>>>>>
>>>>> * Hints that the extra step is not going to break your back
>>>>> * Kind of like 5.1 surround sound
>>>>>
>>>>> By the way, why hasn't this been implimented before? It seems strange
>>>>>
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> me.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Is there something inherent in the architecture of CouchDB that makes
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> this
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> difficult?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> I think it is a matter of time. The people in a position to implement
>>>>> it have not felt quite enough pressure.
>>>>>
>>>>> /me whistles innocently.
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Iris Couch
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
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